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ABSTRACT 
Neuroeconomics—the study of brain activity in people engaged in tasks 
of reasoning and choice—looks set to be the next behavioral economics: a 
set of findings about how people make decisions that casts both light and 
doubt on widely accepted premises about rationality and social life. This 
Article explains what is most exciting about the new field and lays out some 
specific research tasks for it.  
By enabling researchers to view the mind at work, neuroeconomics ap-
pears to contradict a methodological premise of twentieth-century empiri-
cism, sometimes called positivism or behaviorism: that people are black 
boxes to one another, and scientific social inquiry must observe only their 
objective behavior, what they say and do. This premise came to the center 
of neoclassical economic method via the 1930s work of the economist 
Lionel Robbins, and it occasioned a methodological split in social inquiry.1 
Positivists (most importantly, economists) follow the strictures of studying 
observable behavior, while interpretivists insist that we cannot understand 
social life without interpreting the minds and intentions of others, even 
though we cannot view them directly. 
The limits of these two methods have restricted progress in understand-
ing three critical issues for legal scholarship: (1) how people solve collec-
tive-action problems, (2) why some people are more susceptible than others 
to extremist political appeals, and (3) whether “commodification” creates a 
conflict between economic rationality and other values. I show how the 
progress already made in neuroeconomics could make each of these ques-
tions more tractable than it has recently seemed. I conclude that the positiv-
  
   ∗     Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. A.B., Social Studies, Harvard 
College, J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks to Jeff Powell for penetrating comments on an earlier draft. I 
am indebted to David Grewal for directing my attention to the relationship between the history of eco-
nomics and the philosophical problem of interpersonal intelligibility. 
 1. See discussion infra Part II. 
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ist-interpretivist divide persists, with good reason, and that each approach 
needs the other. 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 2 
I. NEUROECONOMICS SO FAR ........................................................................ 5 
A. Moral Reasoning ................................................................................ 6 
B. Rationality and Reciprocity: Ultimatum Games                              
and Other Decisions ....................................................................... 10 
C. Implications for Law? ...................................................................... 13 
II. OTHER MINDS AND THE GREAT DIVIDE ................................................. 15 
A. The Positivist Claim.......................................................................... 15 
B. The Interpretivist Response .............................................................. 21 
III. THREE PROBLEMS FOR NEUROECONOMICS ........................................... 25 
A. Collective Action: Reciprocity, Rationality, or rationality?............. 25 
1. Collective-action Problems ........................................................ 25 
2. Reciprocity as Sympathy: Revising Welfare............................... 26 
3. Reciprocity as Agency: Revising “rationality” .......................... 27 
4. The Question for Neuroeconomics ............................................. 30 
B. Commodification: Is There a There There? ..................................... 31 
1. The Anti-commodification Case ................................................. 31 
2. The Failure of Inquiry and The Question for Neuroeconomics . 33 
C. Authoritarianism: The Highest Stakes and The Otherest Minds...... 34 
1. The Positivist Problem ............................................................... 34 
2. The Persistence of Interpretation ............................................... 37 
3. The Question for Neuroeconomics ............................................. 38 
IV. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 39 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the promise of neuroeconomics? This nascent field has con-
verted a fast-growing set of laboratory results into an impression of great 
promise to change our understanding of choice and rationality.2 Using mag-
  
 2. See, e.g., William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of 
War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243, 1420-21 (2004) (arguing that advances in neuroeconomics may make 
possible the explanation and prediction of compliance with and violations of the international humanitar-
ian law); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
405, 424 (2005) (identifying neuroeconomics as part of a cluster of rapidly advancing inquiries in the 
biology of human behavior that might significantly change our estimation of how law interacts with 
individuals’ reasoning and decisions); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behav-
ioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 714 n.169 
(2005) (noting that neuroeconomics promises to reduce the “guesswork” about the effects of incentives 
on decision-making that have been so important to shaping corporate governance); Paul Steinberg & 
Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 105, 
129-30 (2004) (arguing that neuroeconomics’ revelation of the limits of the rational-actor model of 
human behavior can improve franchise regulation); Sandra Blakeslee, Brain Experts Now Follow the 
Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at F1 (noting the growing importance of neural imaging in research 
into behavioral economics).  
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netic resonance imaging (MRI) technology, neuroscientists observe blood 
flow in the brains of people engaged in familiar tasks of reasoning and 
choice.3 The preliminary results already suggest much about which regions 
of the brain engage in which dimensions of reasoning, choice, and moral 
judgment. Like alchemists who dreamed of finding an elixir of life and mys-
tics who labored to see the face of God, investigators now speak of “seeing 
utility.”4 What we have seen only in a mirror darkly, we might now meet 
vividly and immediately. And in an age when both economics and biology 
have vast reach and authority in the academy and the larger culture, the 
analogy to encountering life’s essence or God’s person might not be alto-
gether far-fetched. For the first time, we could unveil and examine the hid-
den logic of our lives. This is the promise. 
A deflationist response sees neuroeconomics as the false promise of an 
academic culture too enamored of laboratory science and ephemeral trends.5 
Even at its most sophisticated, brain imaging can only give us a map of cor-
relations, which are physical events in the brain that correspond to the activ-
ity of the mind.6 But neoclassical economics rests on the axiom that utility 
functions reveal themselves through actual choice—revealed preference—
and thus, that utility maximization literally just is what we do.7 Thus, it 
gains nothing from peeking into the black box of the brain. As for the het-
erodox proposals of behavioral economics, with its observations about sys-
tematic non-maximizing behavior, there too investigators are concerned 
with the observable behavior of human beings, with their implication for the 
design of institutions and the achievement of cooperation.8 Correlations add 
little or nothing, argues the skeptic. 
In this Article, I argue that the promise of neuroeconomics is even 
greater than the claims its advocates have made for it. To show why, I set 
out a basic methodological division in law and social science. For much of 
the last century, social inquiry, including legal inquiry, has been marked by 
a schism between two methodological schools, neither capable of giving a 
fully satisfactory account of human activity. One camp, which we might call 
positivist, takes observation, prediction, and, ultimately, falsifiability as the 
elements of its gold standard: theories of human activity must meet the 
same standard as theories about species succession or atomic bonding. The 
other, the interpretivist camp, insists that these criteria misapprehend the 
nature of human activity—both individual action and social life—because 
  
 3. Columbia University Functional MRI Center, About functional MRI: The Future Role of func-
tional MRI in Medical Applications, http://www.fmri.org/fmri.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
 4. Colin Camerer, Professor, Cal. Inst. of Tech., “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform 
Economics” (Dec. 8, 2005). 
 5. See, e.g., Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1235, 1237-38 (2005) (noting the argument that neural correlates of already observable behavior 
give us no information that we do not already have).  
 6. See Columbia University Functional MRI Center, supra note 3.  
 7. AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21 (1970). 
 8. See Terrence Chorvat et al., Law & Neuroeconomics 7-8 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished research 
paper, George Mason University, http://ssrn.com/abstract=501063). 
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whatever people do, they do as self-conscious and self-interpreting actors, 
and we cannot explain, predict, or understand human conduct without con-
sidering how the people involved understand themselves. In this account, 
describing human activity while leaving out self-understanding is a cate-
gorical mistake. Whoever makes that mistake ensures that his description 
will miss essential features of what it is meant to describe. 
Neuroeconomics is particularly salient to this schism because the 
schism arose from a deep methodological anxiety about the accessibility of 
any mind to any other mind.9 The basis of the anxiety is the perception that 
we are black boxes to one another, knowable only through observable be-
havior that may or may not correspond to any particular internal state. Even 
the conviction that others have internal states like those we experience in 
ourselves, rather than something completely different, is a point of faith 
rather than verifiable knowledge or a falsifiable hypothesis. As I will show 
later,10 this difficulty helped to motivate the ascent of the methodology of 
contemporary microeconomics and economically informed social inquiry. 
The promise of neuroeconomics is to bring other minds one giant step 
nearer visibility. The effect of this change would be to soften the methodo-
logical opposition between positivism and interpretivism. Diminishing this 
methodological opposition matters because the respective limits of the two 
approaches have inhibited treatment of very important questions. Problems 
concerning what people value and how, how and why we overcome collec-
tive-action problems, and the social-psychological bases of liberalism and 
authoritarianism have suffered from division between the two camps, nei-
ther of which can do them justice. Positivism begs the important question of 
why people act as they do. Without this, every “explanation” is just a corre-
lation. Interpretivism, for its part, carries the original sin of being non-
falsifiable: as its most candid practitioners concede, the hermeneutic circle 
really is closed. 
In Part I of this Article, I survey the most provocative findings of neu-
roeconomics and the closely allied inquiry into the neurology of moral rea-
soning. I then present the competing claims that scholars have made for the 
relevance of this work to law and social inquiry. In Part II, I set the rise of 
neuroeconomics in the context of the twentieth-century methodological split 
between positivism and interpretivisim, showing how the invisibility of 
other minds drove the schism. In Part III, I present several very important 
problems that the schismatic methods have followed into culs-de-sac and 
suggest how even a moderately successful neuroeconomics could aid a 
fruitful rapprochement. I argue that the kind of information that neu-
roeconomics provides cannot dissolve the methodological opposition I have 
described and that we should not wish otherwise, as each methodological 
approach has value not reducible to the terms of the other. Nonetheless, the 
  
 9. See discussion infra Part II. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 85-91. 
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modest rapprochement that neuroeconomics promises might be very valu-
able. Part IV concludes. 
I. NEUROECONOMICS SO FAR 
The tools of neuroeconomics are blunt enough that most findings in-
volve an inevitably simplified distinction between areas of the brain associ-
ated with emotions and others associated with cognitive activity, such as 
conscious memory and calculation.11 The basic technique of MRI brain-
scans is to measure the flow of blood to various brain regions as subjects 
perform exercises in reasoning and choice.12 Findings are generally of this 
form: variations in the reasoning exercise correspond to changes in relative 
activity levels among brain regions, suggesting that certain exercises elicit 
more cognitive capacity while others evoke more emotional responses.13 
These results tend to be most interesting in situations of a particular type: 
where theorists have speculated that several reasoning tasks are indistin-
guishable as a matter of principle (where the principle may be either self-
interest maximization or some stipulated moral rule), yet individuals actu-
ally engaged in the exercises reach different results across tasks.14 The dis-
tribution of neural activity in each task tends to suggest something about the 
character of divergence in actually observed reasoning.15 
Interpretation of these results relies on a model of brain activity in 
which conscious processing is regarded as a relatively scarce resource, able 
to concentrate on only one problem (or at most on a handful of problems) at 
a time, and thus jealously husbanded.16 The model regards unconscious 
processing as relatively abundant, able to receive, integrate, and evaluate a 
great deal of information simultaneously.17 Thus, in this model, an efficient 
brain strives to convert conscious processing to unconscious processing by, 
in effect, generating unconscious programs to handle information and navi-
  
 11. See Jonathan D. Cohen, The Vulcanization of the Human Brain: A Neural Perspective on Inter-
actions Between Cognition and Emotion, 19 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 3, 3-10 (laying out this meth-
odological account). Because this Article is intended for legal scholars interested in the results of neu-
roeconomic studies, and a fair amount of training in neurology would be necessary to assess researchers’ 
classifications of the various brain regions, I distinguish in the text of the Article between “cognitive” 
and “emotional” regions. I do, however, note in footnotes which regions are under examination in each 
study I summarize. Almost all studies identify the prefrontal cortex with reasoning ability and cognitive 
control, that is, the ability to direct action in keeping with abstract commitments or intentions, especially 
when this involves overriding intuitions or reflexes. See id. at 10. By contrast, a set of subcortical struc-
tures, which evolved earlier and are located deeper in the brain, are thought to register immediate emo-
tional or visceral responses to events or circumstances, responses that are transmitted directly to regions 
of the frontal cortical lobes: the amygdala, the medial and orbital regions of the frontal cortex, and the 
insular cortex. See id. at 8-9.  
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. See id. at 4-6. 
 14. I discuss several finds of this sort in Parts I.A-B., infra. 
 15. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 8. 
 16. Id. at 6-7. 
 17. Id. 
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gate circumstances that would otherwise require conscious processing.18 
Learning to ride a bicycle or drive a car provides a simple example: at first 
the activity requires most of the mind’s available conscious attention; soon 
enough, though, it recedes to the “background” of unconscious processing, 
and one can work out a dinner menu or a math problem, have a phone con-
versation, or compose a sonnet while riding or driving. Without hazarding 
complex hypotheses in evolutionary or psychodynamic psychology, neuro-
logical researchers often suppose that emotional responses express uncon-
scious processing, developed either genetically or in individual maturation, 
while cognitive reasoning makes greater demands on conscious process-
ing.19 
A. Moral Reasoning 
The “trolley problem,” much discussed by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is a 
modern classic in the minor genre of moral philosophy dilemmas.20 The 
problem is to generate a moral principle that accounts for widely-held intui-
tions about two hypothetical decisions. Both decisions have the same formal 
structure: whether to sacrifice one life to preserve a larger number of lives. 
Yet people persistently come to very different conclusions depending on the 
narrative that presents the problem. Hence the difficulty: is moral reasoning 
principled at all, or is it just dressed-up ad-hockery? 
The first version of the decision is the simplest. The subject is asked to 
imagine herself the switchperson on a railroad. As a train approaches, she 
realizes that five people stand on the track and that she has no way to warn 
them. All she can do to avert their deaths is to throw the switch and divert 
the train to a side-track—where, unfortunately, a single person is standing. 
Most subjects agree that it is appropriate (a word exposing the difference 
between “permissible” and “required”) to throw the switch. This suggests 
utilitarian reasoning: other things equal, the greatest aggregate good is 
served by preserving five lives, even at the cost of one. 
Now change the problem. Suppose there is no chance to switch the train 
to a second track. Instead, as the train barrels toward the five innocents, the 
subject is to imagine herself standing on a footbridge over the track. (This is 
sometimes called the “footbridge problem,” for the sake of keeping track. 
Pun inadvertent.) She is standing next to an enormously large person. 
(Readers will have their own favorites, perhaps ranging on partisan grounds 
from Arnold Schwarzenegger to Ted Kennedy.) If she pushes her compan-
  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, 
RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 78, 78-93 (William Parent ed., 1986); JUDITH 
JARVIS THOMPSON, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK, supra, at 94-116. The 
problem was originally formulated by Philippa Foot. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and 
the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5, 5-15 (1967).  
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ion onto the track, his weight will stop the train. She is herself too slight to 
make the difference, even if she were inclined to self-sacrifice. 
Formally speaking, the footbridge problem appears identical to the 
original trolley problem: Do you take an action that will result in one death 
but save five lives? Yet many subjects who approved of the action in the 
first problem now find it inappropriate. The minority who stick to their utili-
tarianism tend to hesitate and waver before overriding a deep reluctance to 
push, which they did not feel, at least not in the same degree, when choos-
ing the utility-maximizing action meant simply pulling the switch. 
How, then, to reconcile the two sets of responses under a single princi-
ple? Does that ambition even make sense? One effort involves suggesting, 
on loosely Kantian grounds, that the difference is in using another as a 
means to an end: in the footbridge problem, sacrificing one’s large compan-
ion is instrumentally necessary to saving the five others, while in the trolley 
problem, the death of the one is only incidental to the act of saving the five. 
Inconveniently, however, a simple change in the facts of the trolley problem 
spoils the Kantian hypothesis. Suppose the side-track is a loop that rejoins 
the main track just before the place where the five are standing, but that 
there is a large person on the side-track whose bulk will be enough to stop 
the train. Now, throwing the switch to move the train will still save the five, 
but the death of the one is instrumentally necessary. Yet most subjects now 
move back to a utilitarian judgment, and say throwing the switch is appro-
priate. 
The search for a unifying principle seems lost. We are free to say, of 
course, that people are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; everything 
recounted so far is description, not prescription. What, though, can we say 
about the way moral reasoning proceeds? Can we say that we accept utili-
tarianism up to the point of a switch but not to the point of a shove? If so, 
how should we understand the difference? 
After decades of discussion that circled these problems, a group of neu-
roscientists devised an experiment effectively testing the “switch v. shove” 
account.21 They presented subjects with a battery of sixty hypothetical deci-
sions, coded into three categories: (1) “up close and personal” moral deci-
sions involving relatively intimate actions, including a version of the foot-
bridge problem, a case of harvesting one living person’s organs involuntar-
ily to save five others, and a case of throwing people off an overcrowded 
lifeboat; (2) impersonal moral problems, including a version of the trolley 
problem and a case of voting for a policy that would cause more deaths than 
the alternative; and (3) non-moral decisions, such as whether to take a train 
or a bus given certain time constraints.22 The moral-personal problems were 
  
 21. Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 
293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001).  
 22. See id. at 2106-07. The areas of the brain coded for emotional activity in this experiment were 
the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the left and right angular gyri. Id. The middle 
frontal gyrus and the left and right parietal lobes were associated with cognitive activity and control, i.e., 
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associated with increases in MRI signal of between 20% and 40% percent in 
brain areas associated with emotion; by contrast, none of these areas experi-
enced as much as a 20% increase while subjects addressed the impersonal 
moral problems.23 For two of the four areas, the increase was below 10%.24 
The areas associated with cognitive processing, however, showed increases 
of 15% to 25% during the impersonal moral problems and much lower, or 
even declining activity, for the personal moral problems.25 Non-moral prob-
lems were associated with small increases or even decreases in activity in 
areas associated with emotion, and increases rivaling and sometimes sur-
passing those of impersonal moral problems in areas associated with cogni-
tive processing.26 The results suggested that problems involving direct in-
jury to another person invoke more or less automatic, emotional responses 
of aversion, which are usually powerful enough to pre-empt consciously 
held contrary principles.27 Problems that did not invoke these responses 
appeared to engage a different system, a body of utilitarian principles asso-
ciated with cognitive processing.28 Thus “moral reasoning” appeared to be 
divided among two broad systems of cognition, which responded to differ-
ent features of a problem according to different criteria and thus produced 
incompatible results. 
The researchers advanced the experiment in a later version, in which 
they sought to understand relations among the competing systems of moral 
response.29 This time, their key distinction was between “easy personal” 
judgments and “hard personal” judgments.30 Both categories proposed 
tradeoffs between one life and benefits to others and asked the subject to 
imagine taking the life at close range.31 The exemplary “easy personal” 
case, which they called “infanticide,” asked the subject to consider killing 
an unwanted newborn.32 The exemplary “hard personal” case presented a 
decision whether to smother a crying infant to prevent enemy soldiers from 
discovering and murdering an entire family—including the infant.33 The 
ambition of the experiment was to observe brain activity as two types of 
response—emotional aversion and utilitarian cognition—came into con-
test.34 They found first that difficult judgments—measured by the time sub-
  
the self-conscious governance of moral judgment by abstract principles. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2106. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 2107. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389 (2004). The region of the brain associated with cognitive activity and control 
was the anterior cingulate cortex, while emotional responses were associated with the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex region. Id. at 390. 
 30. Id. at 390-91. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 391. 
 33. Id. at 390. 
 34. See id. at 389. 
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jects took to make their decisions, which corresponded fairly closely to re-
searchers’ conception of the questions as easy or difficult—corresponded to 
increased activity in brain regions associated with mediating conflict among 
responses and enforcing cognitive control over emotional impulses.35 Sec-
ond, they found that subjects who reached a utilitarian judgment about the 
crying baby case—who, in other words, overrode strong emotional aversion 
with utilitarian principle—showed higher levels of activity in the cognitive-
control regions than those who finally declared it inappropriate to smother 
the child.36 In other words, the more conflict between emotion and principle, 
the more cognitive activity, and cognitive activity rises to an even higher 
level when abstract principle overrides emotional response.37 
Even taken in a charitable spirit, this research raises many more ques-
tions than it answers. The categories of “emotion” and “cognition” are dif-
fuse and have uncertain boundaries. Utilitarian reasoning, for instance, pre-
supposes a judgment about who counts as a member of the relevant moral 
community—a question fought in the nineteenth century over race and 
class, and in the twenty-first century over non-human species. In one of the 
classic American comments on race and moral blindness, Mark Twain had 
Huckleberry Finn declare that a steam-engine explosion had hurt nobody—
only “[k]illed a nigger.” 38 Is the judgment underlying that statement cogni-
tive or emotional? What about the change in ideas and sentiments that pro-
duces my reaction as I look at the phrase I have just typed: intense emo-
tional discomfort at a word that carries the ugliest associations combined 
with a principled belief that a modestly unsettling example is the best way 
to communicate the force of the question? What systems would be engaged 
by, for instance, a “principle” of emotional spontaneity—perhaps adopted 
by someone who believed his ethical and interpersonal shortcoming resulted 
from an excess of abstraction and lack of connection with his own feelings? 
The examples are easy to multiply and are not trivial: they lie near the heart 
of actual moral experience. 
Nonetheless, even these relatively primitive findings are enormously 
provocative. They call into question two fairly widespread ideas in moral 
psychology. One is the cognitivist idea that moral reasoning is basically a 
matter of applying principles and that moral development occurs through 
movement from one principle to another.39 The other is the anti-cognitivist 
idea that moral judgments are basically elements of perception—that sen-
  
 35. Id. at 397. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Interestingly, the judgment in favor of smothering the crying baby is also associated with in-
creased activity in one region associated with emotion. Id. Greene and his colleagues suggest, following 
David Hume, that this region may be associated with an emotional motivation to cognitive activity, 
perhaps a commitment to principle or a benevolent attitude toward humanity. Id. 
 38. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 279 (Walter Blair & Victor Fischer eds., 
Univ. of Calif. Press 1985) (1884).  
 39. This view is canonically associated with Lawrence Kohlberg’s account of moral reasoning as 
culminating in the individual’s capacity to apply abstract principles of general reach to specific cases. 
See, e.g., LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984). 
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sory information hits consciousness already interpreted as “good,” “bad,” 
and so forth.40 The results surveyed here strongly suggest interaction be-
tween two sets of responses. One is emotionally powerful and largely pre-
conscious in its evaluations, in the manner envisaged in the anti-cognitivist 
position. The other, which comes into play when the first system comes into 
conflict with explicit principle, seems to involve conscious application of 
principle both to decision problems and to the emotions that those problems 
evoke. The scenarios of the trolley problem, thus, do not display a single 
system of reasoning but rather engage two systems, often complementary, 
which come into conflict as a series of hypothetical trains chug toward dis-
aster. 
B. Rationality and Reciprocity:Ultimatum Games and Other Decisions 
The ultimatum game has been among the most productive experiments 
in behavioral economics. The game involves two players and a pot of 
money. One player proposes a division of the money, which the second 
player accepts or rejects. If the second player accepts the proposed division, 
then both players claim their respective shares of the money. If the second 
player rejects the division, however, the pot of money “dissolves” and nei-
ther player takes anything. 
The game provides a clean test of a prediction of purely self-interested 
behavior. According to that prediction, the first player should propose that 
the second take the smallest divisible unit of money—a penny, let us say, 
or, if a penny is intuitively no longer money at all these days, a nickel—
because he will seek to maximize his gain from the transaction. And the 
second player should accept the division because any offer above zero im-
proves his position. 
Offered the opportunity to demonstrate self-interested rationality, test 
subjects demurred. Student players’ most common offer is “almost always 
50% [of the pot], and mean offers are between 40% and 45%.”41 Respon-
dents are not much more conventionally rational than offerors. When the 
offer falls below 20%, they reject it about half the time.42 Skeptics sug-
gested that the stakes of the game were too low to engage fully rational be-
havior and that players misunderstood the one-off character of the transac-
tion and imagined they were establishing reputations for selfishness or gen-
erosity, but experiments with higher stakes (up to a $400 pot) and with op-
  
 40. A version of this view is sometimes associated with Martha Nussbaum’s early work, notably 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 13-17, 40-43, 316-17 (1986) (describing this view). Nussbaum has continued to take her 
inquiry into the relationship between reflective and unreflective, embedded and self-conscious, or emo-
tional and cognitive moral evaluation in interesting and productive directions. See MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 20-70 (2004) (discussing the 
interaction of emotional response and moral judgment). 
 41. See Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experi-
ments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795, 798 (2005). 
 42. Id. 
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portunities to learn and appreciate the rules of the game yielded much the 
same results.43 
The ultimatum game has benefited from one of the first major cross-
cultural experiments in behavioral economics. When students around the 
world turned up pretty much the same lab results, researchers took the ulti-
matum game to fifteen herding, hunter-gatherer, and slash-and-burn agricul-
tural societies in Asia, Africa, and South America.44 Mean offers ran as high 
as 57% among the Lamalera, a Malaysian island people, and as low as 25% 
among the Quichua, semi-nomadic horticulturalists in South America.45 The 
Tsimane of Bolivia rejected not one of seventy offers, including five offers 
of below 20%.46 The Machiguenga of Peru, who live semi-nomadically in 
the tropical forests of the Amazon, most closely approximated the neoclas-
sical model of self-interested behavior: almost half their offers were below 
20%, and of those, only one was rejected.47 
The persistent results of student ultimatum games inspired a functional 
explanation: that societies do better when their members are motivated to 
behave reciprocally and to punish non-reciprocal behavior.48 Results from 
the intercultural ultimatum game experiments enriched the interpretive ef-
fort. To begin with, offers were generally too high to be consistent with a 
context-adjusted version of self-interest, in which players would be pre-
dicted to make offers that maximized expected income given relevant rejec-
tion thresholds.49 Second, higher offers were significantly correlated with 
what the researchers called “payoff to cooperation” in economic life, that is, 
how much economic well-being depends on actors outside the household.50 
Higher offers were also positively correlated with the social groups’ degree 
of market integration, that is, how frequently members engaged in market 
transactions.51 The interpretation these results suggest, then, is that ideas of 
fairness and reciprocity matter everywhere and modify the neoclassical sup-
position that individuals will act solely to maximize their own self-interest. 
But reciprocity and fairness appear to be variable, rather than fixed, both in 
their hold on individuals and, particularly, in their content across cultures. 
Moreover, day-to-day experience of reciprocity as integral to social life, 
whether through cooperation or through market transactions, appears to 
train people in reciprocal behavior.52 The results are compatible with the 
  
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally id. at 799-807. 
 45. Id. at 802 tbl.2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785, 790-91 
(2003). 
 49. See Henrich et al., supra note 41, at 803-05.  
 50. Id. at 807-08. 
 51. Id.  
 52. This argument about market psychology is classically captured in one of Adam Smith’s lesser-
known arguments:  
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in 
reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest. Men al-
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general interpretation of reciprocity as evolutionarily adaptive but maintain 
considerable space for cultural plasticity and, consequently, individual ha-
bituation into or against reciprocity. 
How, then, to conceive of the relationship between self-interest and re-
ciprocity as elements of players’ reasoning in ultimatum games? Is reciproc-
ity an abstract normative principle akin to utilitarian reasoning, a reflective 
form of self-interest that overrides simple selfishness by taking into account 
the functional benefit of rewarding cooperative behavior and punishing de-
fection, or is it a deeply programmed emotional response? Is the relation-
ship between self-interest and reciprocity an integrated one, as philosophers 
hoped that the “principle” behind the trolley problem would be, or is it a 
contest between distinct aspects of motivation and judgment? 
A group of Princeton researchers addressed a part of this question by 
measuring the neural activity of respondents in an ultimatum game.53 Re-
searchers told respondents that some of their offers would come from living 
offerors, whom respondents briefly met before the game began, while other 
offers were generated by a computer.54 In fact, the researchers manipulated 
the offers to ensure consistent distribution of “fair” (50/50) and “unfair” 
(90/10, 80/20, and 70/30) offers.55 Respondents accepted all 50/50 offers 
and nearly all 70/30 offers.56 Rejection rates, however, ranged between 15% 
and 60% for lower offers; moreover, rejection rates for “unfair” offers asso-
ciated with a human offeror were at least 20 points higher than for “unfair” 
offers attributed to a computer.57 These results suggest that the motive to 
refuse offers perceived as unfair is linked to an idea about interpersonal 
reciprocity, that is, fairness is a matter of reciprocal relations between hu-
man beings, and unfairness a willful withholding of that reciprocity. 
The neural results of the study were particularly interesting. Unfair of-
fers attributed to human partners were associated with elevated levels of 
activity in two areas of the brain.58 One, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
  
ways endeavour to persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no con-
sequence to them. . . . And in this manner every one is practising oratory on others thro the 
whole of his life.—You are uneasy whenever one differs from you, and you endeavour to 
persuade [him] to be of your mind . . . . In this manner [people] acquire a certain dexterity 
and adress [sic] in managing their affairs, or in other words in managing of men . . . . That is 
bartering, by which they adress [sic] themselves to the self interest of the person and seldom 
fail immediately to gain their end. The brutes have no notion of this . . . . 
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 352 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) 
(1762-63) (emphasis added). I have elaborated on the consequences of this argument in Jedediah Purdy, 
A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1237, 1251-58 (2005). 
 53. See Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum 
Game, 300 SCIENCE 1755, 1755-58 (2003). Researchers associated the bilateral anterior insula with 
negative emotional states such as resentment and disgust, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with cogni-
tive activity such as calculation, and the anterior cingulate cortex with cognitive conflict, i.e., a struggle 
to maintain cognitive control in the face of a strong emotional response. Id. at 1756-57. 
 54. Id. at 1756. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 1757. 
File: PurdyMacro Created on: 9/12/2006 8:51 AM Last Printed: 11/7/2006 10:02 AM 
2006] The Promise (And Limits) of Neuroeconomics 13 
(DLPFC) is associated with “cognitive processes such as goal maintenance 
and executive control” and was also associated with utilitarian judgments in 
the moral reasoning studies.59 The other, the bilateral anterior insula (BAI), 
is associated with “negative emotional states” such as anger and disgust, as 
well as with sensations of hunger and thirst.60 Not only were both regions 
engaged by unfair offers attributed to human offerors, but activity in the 
BAI was higher while considering offers that respondents rejected than 
while considering offers they accepted.61 Moreover—although the research-
ers caution against quick conclusions from comparisons of concurrent activ-
ity in different areas of the brain—it appears that respondents reject offers 
when BAI activity is greater than DLPFC activity and vice-versa.62 
These findings are unavoidably broad and preliminary, but they none-
theless suggest several tentative judgments. First, the motive of reciprocity 
in rejecting unfair offers appears linked with very basic experiences of af-
front and deprivation: hunger, thirst, repugnance—all of which register as 
physical and emotional facts, not problems for deliberate evaluation. Sec-
ond, when confronted with unfairness, this motive appears to come into 
direct conflict with a cognitive effort at maximizing self-interest even at the 
cost of absorbing an insult. Under conditions of fairness, the two might eas-
ily work in harmony; but as with the trolley problem, when circumstances 
pull them apart, two quite distinct modes of reasoning enter into a struggle 
for dominance. Third—taking into account cross-cultural findings in ultima-
tum-game experiments—the threshold of “insult” that engages the BAI 
emotional response appears to vary with the principles of reciprocity or non-
reciprocity implicit in the everyday activity of the respondent’s society. 
Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that economic maximizing is also so-
cially learned behavior, at least in some degree. For instance, the content of 
the DLPFC’s cognitive override does not seem likely to be genetically pro-
grammed in its particulars any more than a gene combination is likely to 
turn up for classical utilitarianism, strict Kantianism, or Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency. The overall impression, then, is of an uneasy relation between cog-
nition and emotion, in which the two are sometimes complementary, some-
times at odds, but always distinctly and essentially expressions of different 
types of neural activity. 
C. Implications for Law? 
Reception of neuroeconomics by economics-oriented legal scholars has 
been instrumental in shaping how neuroscience can help the law facilitate 
welfare-maximizing behavior.63 It has also tended to suffer from the prob-
  
 59. Id.; Cohen, supra note 11, at 9. 
 60. See Sanfey, supra note 53, at 1756. 
 61. Id. at 1757. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, The Brain and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 
LOND. 1727, 1734-35 (2004); Chorvat et al., supra note 8, at 3-4. 
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lem of mere correlation. The backdrop is the widely recognized functional 
account of modern law as facilitating transactions among strangers at great 
distances, separating economic life from social and geographic proximity, 
which both facilitated and constrained it for many centuries.64 A major part 
of this institutional achievement is to generate impersonal institutions that 
can substitute effectively for interpersonal trust.65 On this account, the con-
tribution of neuroeconomics is that economic self-interest and the reciproc-
ity characteristic of trust have different correlates in the brain, and may well 
express distinct and potentially competing motivational systems. If this is 
true, then those who design legal systems should be alert to both the bene-
fits of consonance between the systems and the hazards of bringing them 
into conflict. This tension causes what one might think of as drag or friction, 
that is, an emotionally founded reluctance to participate in economically 
rational, impersonal transactions.66 
This is not necessarily an empty contribution, but it flirts with the emp-
tiness of mere correlation. The problem is nicely, and inadvertently, cap-
tured in a passage from Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe’s argument to 
this effect: “If [government] can frame violations of its rules as defections 
from social norms, they are more likely to be punished and often private 
punishment is enough to enforce this obligation. To the extent that society is 
able to frame defection as cheating and invoke social sanctions, enforce-
ment will become easier.”67 The difficulty is that, if social norms is syn-
onymous with whatever new information neuroeconomics has provided us, 
then there is no new information at all, except a new layer of correlation. It 
is not news, after all—although it raised some eyebrows among law-and-
economics scholars in the previous decade—that social norms make a dif-
ference in people’s decisions, that perceptions of “good” and “bad,” “fair” 
and “unfair” matter to legal compliance.68 There has been a fair amount of 
effort to specify the appropriate understanding of the relationship between 
law and norms.69 There may be a time when neuroimaging reveals some-
thing non-obvious about this relationship, but for now, to identify the con-
tribution of neuroeconomics with the contribution of norms theory invites 
the charge of correlation and gives it no answer. 
  
 64. For this argument, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 97. 
 65. North, supra note 64, at 97-98; Chorvak & McCabe, supra note 63, at 1734-35. 
 66. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 63, at 1734-35. 
 67. Id. at 1734 (emphasis added). 
 68. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71 (2003); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1513 (2002); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 
(2000). 
 69. For more specific and empirical recent research, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural 
Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 
(2003).  
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Nonetheless, one sees what the efforts at application are getting at, and 
it is potentially profound. We human beings act persistently against our 
individual and collective interests. Sometimes we behave sub-optimally; at 
other times, we are destructive, even murderous. We know, moreover, that 
the worst things we do often express motives that are not evil, not essen-
tially aimed at waste or destruction, but misplaced or misshapen. Fear is a 
valuable, even a necessary emotion, but we fear things we should not—
whether ambiguity or nuclear power or Tutsis—and so we make mistakes, 
or worse. A visceral reluctance to harm another human being may be an 
essential check on brutality, but it may be that when harming another will 
save hundreds, our deepest moral intuition may be too strong and lead us 
astray. In contrast, if we are considering a political decision to launch cruise 
missiles at a city we have never seen and whose residents we have never 
met, the same intuition may be too weak and give too much play to expedi-
ence and fear. Neuroeconomics promises a glimpse of the neural systems 
where these intuitions—feelings and emotional and cognitive programs—
operate. And this, in turn, suggests that we could better understand why we 
do what we do and how we might improve. Is this right, or is it mere corela-
tions all the way down? 
In the next Part, I propose that the feeling of promise attached to neu-
roeconomic observations expresses frustration with a methodological divide 
characteristic of twentieth-century social science and that understanding the 
culs-de-sac where this divide has led can help us to discern the most impor-
tant questions for which neuroeconomics can make a contribution. 
II. OTHER MINDS AND THE GREAT DIVIDE 
A. The Positivist Claim 
It may seem odd in an article on the latest methodological advances in 
the human sciences to pause over the quaintly named philosophical “prob-
lem of other minds.”70 The problem with other minds, Anglo-American 
philosophers of the early twentieth century concluded, is that they are inac-
cessible to us.71 We can make no direct observation of the subjective ex-
perience of others, nor can we share ours with them. This inaccessibility 
distinguishes others’ subjective experience from two domains that we do 
observe directly: our own subjective experience and external phenomena—
the latter represented by the world outside us except the bits of it contained 
  
 70. ANITA AVRAMIDES, OTHER MINDS xi (2001). For an introduction to the history of philosophical 
treatments of this question, see id. (surveying the history of thought with attention to this and cognate 
problems); cf. ALEC HYSLOP, OTHER MINDS 5-6 (1995). Hyslop denies that the problem is one of ob-
servability and distinguished between observing and experiencing inner states, arguing that the real 
difficulty is “an asymmetry in respect of knowledge” generated by the impossibility of experiencing 
what others experience. Id. This strikes me as a helpful distinction. As will emerge later, it imposes some 
limits on what one might hope to gain by the observations of neuroeconomics. 
 71. See AVRAMIDES, supra note 70, at 3-5 (introducing and considering the problem). 
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with the minds of others.72 We have a fair amount of confidence about our 
observations of our own experience: I am happy, I am in pain, I am fearful, 
I am elated. We observe these facts as directly as we observe anything.73 
The same holds true of our observations of external objects: she is dancing, 
he is falling, they are on fire. Unless our eyes are tricking us, we observe 
these things directly. Such direct observation has implications for knowl-
edge.74 Although it is possible to stake out an epistemologically skeptical 
position and stick to it on principle, direct observation is far and away the 
best candidate for knowledge: we know the things we observe, or we know 
very little at all.75 
Other minds are different. Here trouble begins. How do we know that 
others have subjective experience like our own? When someone says, “I am 
in pain,” how do I know that he means what I mean when I use that phrase? 
Or, perhaps more persuasively, when he says, “I love her,” why should I 
believe that the experience behind the phrase is the same as that I observe in 
myself when I reply, “No, I love her“? What if we then insist, simultane-
ously, “Well, she loves me“? All the evidence we have is words and actions. 
We can suppose that they express the same inner states that we experience 
in ourselves, but we cannot know. 
It would be entirely forgivable to feel that one had not caught the force 
of the “problem” so far. Is this in fact a problem, except for severe neurot-
ics?76 A little more historical texture may help. The problem of other minds 
took wind to its sails from Logical Positivism, a philosophical movement 
that flourished, particularly in Austria and England, in the early decades of 
the twentieth century.77 The ambition of Logical Positivism was to distin-
guish between two types of propositions: those whose truth or falsehood 
could be determined and those that expressed only in conceptual confusion 
or emotional assertion.78 One category of statements that notoriously lacked 
  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Avramides suggests that skepticism about knowledge of the external world tends to be refuted in 
practice by everyday experience of the world, while everyday experience in fact raises and reinforces the 
problem of other minds. Id. at 2 (“The person who is asked to justify her belief that her cat has a mind 
will very soon find herself asking how she knows that other human beings have minds. And, similarly, 
the person who denies minds to computers may soon find herself wondering why she is so sure there are 
any other minds.”).  
 76. There is a view, with impressive philosophical pedigree, that this is just the right characteriza-
tion of an obsession with the problem of other minds. See STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: 
WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY 463 (1979) (suggesting the clinical concept of 
narcissism usefully diagnoses the perception of oneself as unknowable to others in some essential way, 
and also reveals an underlying and frustrated wish to be known); id. at 468-69 (describing a productive 
history of the problem of other minds as requiring “an account of the particular insanity required, or 
caused, or threatened, in the very conceiving of the problem”).  
 77. For a very helpful introduction to the ambitions and method of logical positivism, see A.J. Ayer, 
Editor’s Introduction, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 3 (A.J. Ayer ed., 1959). Like nearly any school or body of 
thought, logical positivism encompassed a variety of inflections and emphases around its core commit-
ments. See id. at 3-9. 
 78. Id. at 17-23 (emphasizing the logical positivist mistrust of claiming truth, verifiability, or falsifi-
ability for statements about value or about the mental states of others). 
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truth and falsity in the logical positivist view was moral claims: good and 
bad, right and wrong, were dressed up assertions of preference and best 
treated as such.79 Another such category was statements involving alleged 
facts about which, in principle, no reliable evidence could be obtained—
such as statements about the nature of God or about other minds.80 Claims 
about the contents of other people’s minds were exemplary of the kinds of 
confusion of prejudice or wishful thinking with knowledge-claims that the 
logical positivists sought to banish from respectable inquiry.81 
As David Grewal has recently argued, the advent of the now-dominant 
economic model of behavior was directly linked with the intellectual culture 
of logical positivism in general and with the problem of other minds in par-
ticular.82 Lionel Robbins, the English economist who contributed much to 
bringing about the so-called ordinalist revolution in Anglo-American eco-
nomics, founded an important part of his case on the impossibility of know-
ing the utility levels of others.83 Robbins’s motivation was to purify eco-
nomics as a positive science by purging it of knowledge-claims that could 
not pass the logical positivist bar.84 Although an ordinalist approach to eco-
nomics had found earlier adherents in England on similar philosophical 
grounds, and likewise on the continent, Robbins’s arguments were decisive 
in the ordinalist triumph in Anglo-American economics.85 This was particu-
  
 79. Id. at 21-23. 
 80. Id. at 17-21. 
 81. Id. at 17 (“There could be no question of our literally sharing one another’s sense-data, any 
more than we can literally share one another’s thoughts or images or feelings.”). 
 82. See David Singh Grewal, Utility and Interpersonal Comparability: Skepticism About ‘Other 
Minds’ in Neoclassical Economics (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 83. See Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 
22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 520-24 (1984) (recounting Robbins’s critique, on these grounds, of the 
ambitions to utility measurement of earlier modes of English economics). Robbins pioneered his critique 
of previous economics theory in LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 136-58 (2d ed. 1935) (summarizing his attack on the concept of cardinal measures 
of utility and insisting, inter alia, on the importance of value-relativism in setting the limits of economic 
inquiry). This also comports with the capsule history of ordinalism’s rise given by Amartya Sen. See 
AMARTYA SEN, The Possibility of Social Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 65, 71 (2002) 
(“[E]conomists came to be persuaded by arguments presented by Lionel Robbins and others (deeply 
influenced by ‘logical positivist’ philosophy) that interpersonal comparisons of utility had no scientific 
basis: ‘Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feelings is possi-
ble.’ Thus, the epistemic foundations of utilitarian welfare economics were seen as incurably defective.”) 
(quoting Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635, 637 
(1938)) [hereinafter Interpersonal Comparisons] (internal citation omitted). 
 84. See Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 83, at 522 (recounting the influence and positivism in 
Robbins’s circle and concluding that “Robbins went a long way in the positivist direction of excluding 
ethical and mental concepts from science”).  
 85. Most significant among these was William Stanley Jevons, a nineteenth-century theorist, rela-
tively marginal in his day, to whom Robbins looked as an indispensable predecessor. Philosophically, 
Jevons was a utilitarian skeptic: he believed that subjective pleasure, or “psychological hedonism,” was 
the proper measure of well-being, but that there was no way to unify the measurement of pleasure across 
persons because satisfactions were incorrigibly idiosyncratic. See LORD ROBBINS, The Place of Jevons in 
the History of Economic Thought, in THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY AND OTHER 
PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 169, 170-77 (1970) (recounting Jevons’s thoughts). 
Robbins argued that this dimension of Jevons’s thought was unnecessary, but that its skeptical impulse, 
purified of its other commitments, laid a proper foundation for scientific economic inquiry. See 
ROBBINS, supra note 83, at 85 (“[T]he hedonistic trimmings of the works of Jevons and his followers 
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larly pressing because much of English economics into the 1930s was clas-
sically utilitarian; that is, it sought to advise policymakers on the best means 
of maximizing the utility of the nation, summed across persons.86 Such an 
effort necessarily involves hypotheses about the relative utility of different 
persons, which English utilitarianism accomplished chiefly through the as-
sumption of declining marginal utility, that is, that with increasing wealth, 
the gain in utility from each new sum is less than at lower levels of wealth.87 
But the claim to know that one person is experiencing a greater level of 
satisfaction than another concerns the subjective experience of another—a 
cardinal instance of wishful thinking or idle speculation masquerading as a 
claim to truth. Mixing such speculation with economic science was like 
mixing morality with mathematics. 
Robbins made precisely this argument in his famous An Essay on the 
Nature and Significance of Economic Science,88 where he launched his ar-
  
were incidental to the main structure of a theory which—as the parallel development in Vienna 
showed—is capable of being set out and defended in absolutely non-hedonistic terms.”). Cooter and 
Rapport agree with this characterization of Robbins’s contribution, concluding, “Jevons used the subjec-
tive definition and remarked that there is no compelling way to compare the pleasures of different peo-
ple. Robbins merely embedded this familiar claim in positivist philosophy.” Cooter & Rappoport, supra 
note 83, at 522.  
 86. For a hostile characterization of this approach, see ROBBINS, supra note 83, at 4-11, for a de-
scription of the “materialist” conception of economics, which attempted empirical measurements of 
well-being. For a friendlier description, see Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 83, at 512-20, for a descrip-
tion of the method and ambitions of the “material welfare school” of English economics. It is abundantly 
clear that the ambitions of the material welfare school reappear in the contemporary work of Amartya 
Sen, who has proposed a version of welfare economics attentive to the measurement of “capabilities,” 
that is, the range of human potentials that individuals are able to realize in the activity. This is a more 
nuanced and open-ended conception than the emphasis on physical functioning that informed the classi-
cal materialist approach; nonetheless, it proposes that by understanding how resources matter to human 
beings by enabling them to function in their lives, it is possible to say something useful about the rela-
tionship between distribution of resources and aggregate well-being—that is, it is possible to make 
meaningful, if not entirely precise, comparisons of welfare across persons. Sen has developed this posi-
tion in many essays. See AMARTYA SEN, Goods and People, in RESOURCES, VALUES AND 
DEVELOPMENT 509, 509-29 (1984); AMARTYA SEN, Markets and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND 
FREEDOM, supra note 83, at 501, 501-27; AMARTYA SEN, Opportunities and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY 
AND FREEDOM, supra note 83, at 583, 583-622; AMARTYA SEN, Freedom and the Evaluation of Oppor-
tunity, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 83, at 659, 659-95; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT 
AS FREEDOM (1999).  
 87. Robbins accordingly made an attack on the “scientific” status of the hypothesis of declining 
marginal utility central to his arguments. See ROBBINS, supra note 83, at 137-38 (“The Law of Diminish-
ing Marginal Utility . . . is derived from the conception of a scarcity of means in relation to the ends 
which they serve. It assumes that, for each individual, goods can be ranged in order of their significance 
for conduct; and that, in the sense that it will be preferred, we can say that one use of a good is more 
important than another. Proceeding on this basis, we can compare the order in which one individual may 
be supposed to prefer certain alternatives with the order in which they are preferred by another individ-
ual. . . . But it is one thing to assume that scales can be drawn up showing the order in which an individ-
ual will prefer a series of alternatives . . . . It is quite a different thing to assume that behind such ar-
rangements lie magnitudes which themselves can be compared. This is not an assumption which need 
anywhere be made in modern economic analysis, and it is an assumption which is of an entirely different 
kind from the assumption of individual scales of relative valuation.”). As this somewhat long excerpt 
shows, rejection of the assumption of diminishing marginal utility was lodged at the heart of Robbins’s 
argument about the non-comparability of personal utility levels.  
 88. ROBBINS, supra note 83.  
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gument against the then-prevalent English fusion of utilitarian ethics and 
economic analysis: 
Now, of course, in daily life we do continually assume that the [in-
terpersonal] comparisons can be made. But the very diversity of the 
assumptions actually made at different times and in different places 
is evidence of their conventional nature. In Western democracies 
we assume for certain purposes that men in similar circumstances 
are capable of equal satisfactions. Just as for purposes of justice we 
assume equality of responsibility in similar situations as between 
legal subjects, so for purposes of public finance we agree to assume 
equality of capacity for experiencing satisfaction from equal in-
comes in similar circumstances as between economic subjects. But, 
although it may be convenient to assume this, there is no way of 
proving that the assumption rests on ascertainable fact. And, indeed, 
if the representative of some other civilization were to assure us that 
we were wrong, that members of his caste (or his race) were capa-
ble of experiencing ten times as much satisfaction from given in-
comes as members of an inferior caste (or an “inferior” race), we 
could not refute him. We might poke fun at him. We might flare up 
with indignation, and say that his valuation was hateful, that it led 
to civil strife, unhappiness, unjust privilege, and so on and so forth. 
But we could not show that he was wrong in any objective sense, 
any more than we could show that we were right.89  
In an essay a few years later, Robbins again used the example of cul-
tural variation in assumptions about utility, sketching a South Asian Brah-
min who purports to be capable of ten times as much happiness as an un-
touchable.90 He concluded:  
I had no sympathy with the Brahmin. But I could not escape the 
conviction that, if I chose to regard men as equally capable of satis-
faction and he to regard them as differing according to a hierarchi-
cal schedule, the difference between us was not one which could be 
resolved by the same methods . . . as were available in other fields 
of social judgment.91 
In Robbins’s telling, the problem of other minds not only scuttles the 
specific claim that people experience equal utility under like circumstances, 
  
 89. Id. at 140. I am grateful to David Grewal for drawing my attention to this passage, which he 
uses in making the same argument about Robbins: that his role in the ordinalist revolution was inspired 
by the problem of other minds. See Grewal, supra note 82, at 8-10. 
 90. Interpersonal Comparisons, supra note 83, at 636.  
 91. Id. Again, David Grewal showed me this remark of Robbins’s and has given substantially the 
same analysis of it. See Grewal, supra note 82, at 9. 
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it makes untenable any interpersonal comparison of utilities.92 This is so 
because claims about the utility of others are neither falsifiable nor verifi-
able: in the face of disagreement, arguers can have no recourse to facts; they 
can only reiterate their judgments more emphatically.93 As Robbins wrote, 
they can “flare up,” call the opposing view “hateful,” or claim that holding 
it will have undesirable results for the social world, but they cannot show 
that it is false, any more than the opponent can show that it is true.94 Such a 
claim has no place in a scientific method of social inquiry.95 
The essential connection between Robbins’s conclusion and the method 
of contemporary economics is that the ordinalist account of rationality and 
utility provides a model of decision-making avoiding any comparison of 
utility among persons. Instead the ordinalist model assumes that (1) indi-
viduals have introspective knowledge of their own preferences, so they are 
able to evaluate choices according to the levels of satisfaction they will 
bring about for them; (2) the decisions they make, which are objectively 
observable, will be consistent with, and thus reveal, their preferences; and 
(3) the observed pattern of decisions will consequently be utility-
maximizing for each person. Note that these claims allow no inference 
about whether one person’s utility in a given state of affairs is greater or less 
than another person’s in the same (or, for that matter, a different) state of 
affairs. The only kinds of knowledge this approach requires—or permits—
are introspective and externally observable, with the two kinds being 
bridged by the assumption that introspective knowledge of one’s own utility 
function translates into objectively observable decisions. 
It should be evident that this version of economic method has at least an 
elective affinity with non-utilitarian modes of welfare economics, particu-
larly Pareto’s conception of efficiency, which requires only non-interference 
with individual utility levels and includes no notion of aggregating utility, 
which would require an interpersonal metric of utility.96 My interest here, 
though, is in a different point: the connection between an economic method 
that avoids the problem of other minds and the general conception of scien-
  
 92. See Interpersonal Comparisons, supra note 83, at 637-39. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Naturally it is entirely possible to state a normative principle that people shall be regarded as 
experiencing like utility under like circumstances and to make judgments about public policy on that 
basis, but this is not social inquiry or explanation. Treating interpersonal comparisons of utility in this 
manner gives them exactly the same status that the logical positivist C.L. Stevenson gave to ethical 
judgments. See C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM, supra 
note 77, at 264, 278-79. He argued that they made sense only as conventional agreements to name cer-
tain objective states of the world “bad” or “good” and to draw imperatives of action from those conven-
tional descriptions. Id. at 276-80. He denied utterly that the stipulation of “bad” or “good” was itself 
subject to reason evaluation. Id. at 281. Disagreements as to this issue admitted of only the kinds of 
tantrums that Robbins suggested might follow from quarrels over interpersonal utility. 
 96. This is the main argument of Grewal, supra note 82. See also SEN, supra note 83, at 71-72 
(recounting the development in which the rejection of interpersonal comparisons of utility, by reducing 
“the informational base on which [any] social choice could draw,” cleared the way for “a so-called ‘new 
welfare economics,’ which used only one basic criterion of social improvement, viz, the ‘Pareto com-
parison’”). 
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tific social inquiry that arose with logical positivism and took on board its 
conception of what could constitute knowledge. The microeconomic model 
of decision-making that I have just sketched built into its premises the sort 
of epistemic chastity that this model of social inquiry celebrated, and thus 
provided a tool-kit well adapted to the formulation of decorous questions 
and chaste answers. 
In a fine polemical statement of this methodological ambition, the logi-
cal positivist Otto Neurath declared that social inquiry must be subject to 
the same standard as any other inquiry: creating a unified set of generaliza-
tions “equal to the task of serving, as often as possible, to predict individual 
events or certain groups of events.”97 A method of social inquiry geared to 
these criteria must contain no meaningless statements, which would at best 
obscure and, far more often, outright confuse the inquiry.98 Neurath charac-
terized any claim to knowledge of the self-understanding of others as mean-
ingless in this sense, that is, not subject to objective assessment and thus 
adding other confusion or nothing at all.99 Methods that claimed a place for 
“empathy” or “understanding” of the motives or ideas on which people act 
came in for special scorn.100 Like claims about the utility of others, or ethi-
cal statements, claims resting on “empathy” or “understanding” could be 
neither verified nor falsified because they did not refer to a realm of phe-
nomena to which inquirers had access.101 They might chance to be true, as 
claims about the utility of others or about the nature of God might chance to 
be true, but there was no building a science out of such shots in the dark. All 
social inquiry must be behaviorist, that is, concerned only with the observ-
able activity of individuals and groups. 
Readers will recognize the connection between Neurath’s methodologi-
cal polemic and the famous later claim of Karl Popper, himself deeply in-
fluenced by logical positivism, that social inquiry must produce falsifiable 
predictions or else be subject to endless and epistemically fruitless manipu-
lation.102 They will also recognize the connection with the economics-
influenced model of social explanation familiar from law and economics, 
rational-choice theory, and economically influenced sociology: a simple 
model of individual decision-making, involving no claims about the mental 
states of others, which produces testable hypotheses about the behavior of 
individuals and institutions given certain circumstances. 
B. The Interpretivist Response 
The positivist model of social explanation has not overwhelmed all al-
ternatives. Instead, it has produced a schism in social inquiry between posi-
  
 97. Otto Neurath, Sociology and Physicalism, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM, supra note 77, at 282, 293. 
 98. Id. at 295. 
 99. Id. at 295-96. 
 100. Id. at 296-97. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See generally 1 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1st ed. 1945). 
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tivists and interpretivists, who maintain what Neurath rejected: that an ade-
quate account of human activity requires attention to the self-understanding 
of others. The most rigorous and articulate exponent of this view is the phi-
losopher and law professor Charles Taylor. In a decades-long series of ar-
guments, Taylor has developed a position that may be stated in the follow-
ing propositions. (1) Human beings are self-conscious animals, aware of 
making decisions from among alternatives.103 (2) We experience ourselves 
as making these decisions not willy-nilly, but for reasons: for instance, we 
choose an action because we think it is right, or better than the alternative, 
or more dignified, or more consistent with who we think we are; we avoid 
or regret an action that we regard as wrong, worse, asinine, or out of charac-
ter (unless we think our character needs amending!).104 (3) Consequently, 
we always act under descriptions or interpretations of our actions and the 
context in which they take place. Our lives never present themselves to us 
as raw fact, but always as interpreted activity.105 (4) These descriptions are 
not idiosyncratic but deeply shaped by shared ideas about human beings, the 
social world, and the natural world.106 It is only shared understandings of 
this sort that make certain objective actions into “performing mime theater,” 
“hitting on someone,” “coming out of the closet,” “negotiating a contract,” 
or “being a Trappist Monk.”107 Try performing mime or coming out of the 
closet in, say, Homeric Greece, and you will (or would, if the experiment 
were literally possible) be lucky to get away with merely the kind of mutual 
incomprehension and irritation that Robbins envisioned with his hypotheti-
cal Brahmin. (5) As the last point indicates, shared understandings differ 
across time and place. Actions that are altogether intelligible in one setting, 
even regarded as essentially human there (such as striking a contract or pub-
licly acknowledging one’s sexuality), will not make sense in another setting. 
Indeed, for most people in that second setting, even the idea of the action 
may be inaccessible: can we really know what it meant to be one of the me-
dieval Christians who sent their young to Jerusalem in the Children’s Cru-
sade? (6) Consequently, there is a relevant sense in which people, unlike 
any other object of inquiry, do not obey the same rules across time and 
space. They will react differently to the same external stimuli because those 
stimuli will have different meaning for them, depending on who they are.108 
  
 103. See CHARLES TAYLOR, What Is Human Agency?, in HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15, 15-
44 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals, in HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, supra, at 
45, 45-76. 
 104. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 25-52 (1989) (describing the relationship be-
tween self-conscious and self-interpreting agents and the questions of value they confront). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 29-42; see CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15, 37 (1985) (so arguing, with particular reference to the concept and 
practice of negotiation). 
 108. See TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?, supra note 103, at 43 (“[I]f we take the view that man is 
a self-interpreting animal, then we will accept that a study of personality which tries to proceed in terms 
of general traits alone can have only limited value.”); TAYLOR, supra note 107, at 55 (“[T]he . . . most 
fundamental reason for the impossibility of hard prediction [of human action] is that man is a self-
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Of course, they will display behavioral regularities within a cultural practice 
that they belong to, for that is part of what makes a cultural practice, but to 
explain what they are doing, you will need reference to the practice and the 
shared understandings that make it intelligible to its participants.109 If you 
try to abstract from those considerations, you will get two results. First is an 
account that presents correlations between stimuli and behavior without 
reference to the underpinnings of the activity, which are not simply physical 
facts, but also self-understandings shaped by participation in shared inter-
pretations.110 Of course, you may be willing to jettison self-understandings, 
as long as physical facts suffice to fill out the correlations. But then the 
problem is the second feature of the result: an account whose validity stops 
at the border of the practice in which the correlation occurs, whether in time 
or in space.111 
Let us say, then, that you want to answer a social question with real 
stakes: Why did nationalist and fascist ideologies display wide appeal in the 
twentieth century? Correlatively, how can we tell whether, and if so where, 
such ideologies present a threat to freedom and tolerance today? Taylor’s 
argument implies that trying to answer such a question by reference solely 
to objective facts—the incentives the constitutional structure give to politi-
cians, the trajectory of the national economy, the historical proximity of 
military defeat or colonial domination—will not take us as far as we should 
want to go. The same logic applies to another urgent contemporary ques-
tion: Why do certain populations produce suicide bombers while others—
also poor, on the losing end of recent history, and beset by political repres-
sion—do not? In providing such explanations and predictions, Taylor sug-
gests that we will want to supplement our positivism, at least, with an at-
tempt to understand how the ideological appeal of fascism or martyrdom 
offers a new collective self-understanding—of national identity, for in-
stance, and of the nation’s history—and recruits followers into it. That is, 
we will want to make a trip to the heart of shared understandings, of “empa-
thy,” in Neurath’s dismissive term. 
Yet even though the positivist program is unsatisfactory, its criticism of 
the interpretive mode is potent. That the minds of others are not directly 
available to us is not a niggling point, but a basic impediment to judging 
whether any particular inquiry is elucidating or obscuring the object of 
  
defining animal. With changes in his self-definition go changes in what man is, such that he has to be 
understood in different terms. But the conceptual mutations in human history can and frequently do 
produce conceptual webs which are incommensurable, that is, where the terms cannot be defined in 
relation to a common stratum of expressions.”). 
 109. See TAYLOR, supra note 107, at 55 (“The entirely different notions of bargaining in our society 
and in some primitive ones provide an example. Each will be glossed in terms of practices, institutions, 
ideas in each society which have nothing corresponding to them in the other.”). 
 110. Id. at 38 (“We can allow, once we accept a certain set of institutions or practices as our starting 
point . . . that we can easily take as brute data that certain acts are judged to take place or certain states 
judged to hold within the semantic field of these practices . . . .”). 
 111. Id. at 55 (on the consequences of incommensurability of interpretations and practices across 
time and space). 
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study. In beginning an interpretive inquiry, one must make methodological 
choices, and those involve presuppositions about the content of other minds. 
The method may be psychoanalytic, seeking the sources of violent ideolo-
gies in suppressed anger and distorted sexual desire.112 It may be Marxist, 
involving claims about the relationship of ideology to economic position.113 
It may be, in the manner of Taylor himself, simply an attempt to give a rich 
description of the shared understandings that arise and are articulated 
around particular political movements.114 Or, taking a cue from Tocqueville, 
it may put substantial trust in the acuity and synthetic power of the observer, 
inviting her to put together a story about ideological motivation out of dis-
parate observations and interpretive intuitions.115 
How, then, to say which approach is helpful and which misleading? 
There is no fully satisfactory answer. Each of these approaches can purport 
to interpret a given episode consistently with its methodological commit-
ments. Moreover, the predictions will tend to incorporate those commit-
ments so as to be non-falsifiable: for instance, “I predict that violent ideolo-
gies will have appeal to populations where suppression of anger and shame 
at sexuality result in sado-masochistic impulses directed at out-groups.” 
That may well be right, but the statement does not come in testable form. 
The non-appearance of violent ideologies will simply be evidence of the 
relative weakness of sado-masochism in politics. To know more, we would 
have to do what we cannot: get access to the mental states of others, to 
“see” the descriptions under which they reason and act. 
This is the origin of the wish that neuroeconomics addresses: to see 
other minds. If we could truly do that, there would be no contradiction be-
tween the empiricist stricture against straying from observable phenomina 
and the interpretivist recognition that people act on ideas, narratives, and 
worldviews that they carry in their minds. The catch, of course, is that see-
ing a brain is not the same as seeing a mind. In the next part of this Article, I 
treat the promise and the limits of the answer neuroeconomics gives to this 
wish.  
  
 112. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 126 
(2004) (associating nihilistic and fanatical political violence with the psychological sources). 
 113. See, e.g., ASHOK DHAWALE, THE SHIV SENA: SEMI-FASCISM IN ACTION 64-69 (2000) (applying 
Marxist class analysis to the political success of the Hindu nationalist party in Bombay); RAYMOND 
WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 96 passim (1973) (describing transformation in rural property 
relations and ideas of rural life in broadly Marxist terms). 
 114. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 104, at 393-418 (describing the worldview and idea of person-
hood that, on his account, gave impetus to both humanitarian political movements and nationalism in the 
nineteenth century). 
 115. For the cardinal instance of the type, see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
(J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1966). For a relatively recent work of 
interpretive sociology proceeding frankly in this vein, see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996), arguing, on the basis of a syn-
thetic interpretation drawn from many individual conversations, that American ideas of the dignified and 
meaningful life are difficult to reconcile with any rich practice of community and commitment, and thus 
tend to be self-undermining in practice. 
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III. THREE PROBLEMS FOR NEUROECONOMICS  
A. Collective Action: Reciprocity, Rationality, or rationality? 
1. Collective-action Problems 
Legal and public-policy analysis have given attention for decades to 
“collective-action problems.” The structure of these problems is that indi-
viduals acting on the neoclassical model of rationality will find it in their 
interest not to contribute to arrangements that benefit the group overall. 
Canonical examples include the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where each player’s 
pursuit of a dominant (always rationally preferred) strategy yields a sub-
optimal outcome; the Voter Paradox, where each individual’s good reason 
not to participate in a collective practice causes the practice to break down; 
and the Tragedy of the Commons, where individual pursuit of maximum 
gain from a common resource results in exhaustion of the resource. 
Amartya Sen has phrased the matter in a way that captures its two-sided 
implications: “Game-theoretic analyses have contributed to a better under-
standing of some of the difficulties that the concept of ‘rationality’ must 
face and have clarified the nature of some problems that social organization 
must deal with.”116 Put differently, collective-action problems may present 
at least two kinds of difficulty for social practices and institutions. First, 
they may present prudential problems: it might be unwise to introduce or 
maintain a resource-governance regime with the incentive structure of a 
commons tragedy. Second, collective-action problems may present a theo-
retical difficulty: if it is true that actions contributing to social optimality are 
individually irrational, those who seek to understand social practices and 
institutions may have to revise their understanding of their topic. Here, how-
ever, the other side of collective-action problems enters. It would be a basic 
mistake to imagine that once a theoretical account of rationality has 
“proven” the “irrationality” of a practice that is in fact widespread, such as 
voting, theorists and voters alike must either give up the practice or go in 
search of “non-rational” explanations. In the natural sciences, observed data 
is decisive: a result inconsistent with a theory falsifies the theory. In theo-
retical social inquiry, we owe facts at least the decency to contemplate that 
their persistence might indicate a problem in any theory that purports to 
debunk them. 
The situation calls for a middle way, which fetishizes neither existing 
practices nor a particular conception of rationality. Efforts to reconcile ob-
served practice with theories of rationality have taken many tacks, from 
Robert Axelrod’s argument that reiterated games produce reciprocity among 
self-interested individuals117 to Carol Rose’s contention that a plurality of 
  
 116. See AMARTYA SEN, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra 
note 83, at 206, 207. 
 117. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-35 (1984).  
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motives is necessary to explain the emergence of cooperative practices118 to 
James Acheson’s studies of actually existing common resources and the 
management practices that accompany them.119 Here I concentrate on two: 
Dan Kahan’s proposal that reciprocity is at least as motivationally important 
as self-interest narrowly understood and Amartya Sen’s argument that a 
conception of rationality that emphasizes agency over welfare would better 
capture the reality of judgment and choice.120 
2. Reciprocity as Sympathy: Revising Welfare 
Kahan’s argument nicely summarizes a strong version of the sorts of 
behavioral economics inquiries sketched in Part I in connection with neuro-
imaging experiments. He asserts that according to “the reciprocity theory” 
of motivation to collective action, (1):  
“Most persons think of themselves and want to be understood by 
others as cooperative and trustworthy and are thus willing to con-
tribute their fair share to securing collective goods. By the same to-
ken, most individuals loathe being taken advantage of. Accordingly, 
if they perceive that most other individuals are shirking, they too 
hold back to avoid feeling (or being) exploited.”121 
(2) Either reciprocity or non-reciprocity can characterize a social state: 
“[T]here is no ‘dominant’ . . . strategy. . . . [I]nterdependencies [of reciproc-
ity-based motivation] tend to generate patterns of collective behavior char-
acterized by multiple equilibria punctuated by tipping points” between re-
ciprocal and non-reciprocal equilibria.122 (3) In light of (1) and (2), policy-
makers should seek to promote contribution to collective goods not just by 
creating positive economic incentives but also by promoting trust, leading 
people to believe that others will contribute, and thus to contribute them-
selves, in the virtuous circle of a high-reciprocity equilibrium.123 Moreover 
(4), individual motivation to reciprocate or withhold contributions both var-
ies across individuals at any time and varies with dynamic interactions be-
tween individuals’ present motives and what they perceive to be the motives 
and actions of relevant others.124 
Just what kind of modification does Kahan’s “reciprocity view” offer to 
the conventional understanding of collective-action problems? The unifying 
  
 118. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative The-
ory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 53 (1990). 
 119. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-50, 73-76 (1988). 
 120. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 71-72 (2003); SEN, supra note 116, at 13-19.  
 121. Kahan, supra note 120, at 73. 
 122. Id. at 74-75. 
 123. Id. at 76-77. 
 124. Id. at 78-79. 
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idea of the proposal is that people’s motivations are neither as fixed nor as 
self-regarding as neoclassical accounts would have it. This general idea, 
however, may take any of several specific forms. Sen provides a way of 
understanding these alternative specifications in a discussion of “several 
quite distinct components of ‘privateness’ in the concept of persons used in 
standard economic theory.”125 Conventional economic analysis relies on 
assumptions about three aspects of “motivation,” to use Kahan’s term, and 
interprets each in a “private” way, to use Sen’s word. First, on the level of 
welfare, it assumes that a person’s “welfare depends only on his or her own 
consumption (and in particular, it does not involve any sympathy or antipa-
thy toward others).”126 Second, on the level of goals, it assumes that “[a] 
person’s only goal is to maximize his or her own welfare . . . (and in par-
ticular, it does not involve directly attaching importance to the welfare of 
others).”127 Third, on the level of decision or action, “[e]ach act of choice of 
a person is guided immediately by the pursuit of one’s own goal (and in 
particular, it is not restrained by the recognition of other people’s pursuit of 
their goals).”128 
Kahan’s proposal operates on the first level, contending that reciprocity 
plays a major role in constituting welfare, or utility. The claim is that most 
people’s experience of welfare is interpersonally dependent: we feel good 
when others treat us reciprocally and regard us as taking the same attitude 
toward them. This interpretation thus involves no modification of conven-
tional claim (2) or (3), which make goals and choices functions of welfare—
those can proceed undisturbed once Kahan has specified the substantive 
content of welfare. Kahan’s quarrel, then, is not with the formal structure of 
rationality that undergirds the theory of collective-action failure but with the 
assumption that the source of the welfare that individuals seek to maximize 
excludes the one quality that could make the collective-action problems 
self-solving: reciprocity itself. 
3. Reciprocity as Agency: Revising “rationality” 
In his discussion of collective-action problems, Sen proposes a different 
modification, addressed less to the experience of welfare than to the charac-
ter of agency. Sen aptly identifies Kahan’s type of interdependent personal 
welfare as “sympathy,” which “refers to one person’s welfare being affected 
by the position of others,” meaning here not their welfare, but their attitude 
of reciprocity or non-reciprocity.129 While acknowledging the possibility of 
this modification, Sen evinces a great interest in what he calls “commit-
  
 125. See SEN, supra note 116, at 213. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 214. 
 129. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting AMYARTA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND 
MEASUREMENT 7-8 (1982)). Using the term in this way involves a modification of Sen’s meaning, as he 
intends “position” to refer to others’ level of welfare. 
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ment,” which involves conceiving of choice as founded not exclusively in 
individual welfare (whether imagined as including or excluding sympathy) 
but also on “identity,” or “our view of ourselves . . . the way we view our 
welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations.”130 Sen’s objection to the model of 
rationality that generates theoretical collective-action problems is that they 
are too scanty in their conception of rationality: they undervalue the impor-
tance of choice to our capacity for self-scrutiny, reflection, and context-
spanning commitment.131 These processes of reasoning, in turn, necessarily 
reflect the substance of the person’s identity, the groups or institutions or 
traditions with which she aligns herself.132 The weight of Sen’s modification 
is not on the way experience registers on the person as a source of welfare 
but rather on what satisfactions, commitments, principles, or other aspects 
of her identity the agent reflectively affirms as reason for action. Choice is 
thus not a function of welfare but the independent fulcrum of reflective ac-
tion, responsive to welfare, but reflectively and not compulsorily so. 
One consequence of Sen’s account is that many different rankings of 
priorities, including many different relative weightings of personal welfare, 
may be consistent with rationality. Where the neoclassical model produces 
dominant strategies with suboptimal consequences, Sen contends, there is 
nothing authoritative about the account of rationality that generates those 
strategies. It is equally cogent to say that one rationally chooses not to de-
fect from a collective enterprise because of the value one places on one’s 
own future well-being, the aggregate long-term well-being of those who 
share in the enterprise (such as other citizens), or the principles the enter-
prise seeks to bring about (for example, general prosperity or political lib-
erty).133 It may be a stretch to insist that such considerations are all constitu-
ents of “welfare,” unless the move is purely axiomatic, i.e., whatever pref-
erences we reveal by choice must be welfare-maximizing. It is not, how-
ever, a stretch to say that these are the considerations one has reflectively 
adopted and pursued. 
This way of putting the argument may seem to miss the force of collec-
tive-action problems. It is all very well to say that people prefer states of the 
  
 130. See id. at 215. 
 131. AMARTYA SEN, General Introduction, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 83, at 1, 36. 
As Sen puts it, “A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one’s own consumption, experience and 
appreciate one’s welfare, and have one’s goals, but also an entity that can examine one’s values and 
objectives and choose in the light of those values and objectives.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. See SEN, supra note 116, at 215. As Sen puts it: 
A person’s concept of his own welfare can be influenced by the position of others in ways 
that may go well beyond ‘sympathizing’ with others and may actually involve identifying 
with them. Similarly, in arriving at goals, a person’s sense of identity may well be quite cen-
tral. And, perhaps most important in the context of the present discussion, the pursuit of pri-
vate goals may well be compromised by the consideration of the goals of others in the group 
with whom the person has some sense of identity.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 133. See SEN, supra note 116, at 212. As Sen puts it here, “The point is not that rationality must take 
us to the communal principle, rejecting the individualistic one, but that there is a genuine ambiguity here 
about what rationality might require . . . .” Id. 
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world in which joint enterprises can flourish and the right principles (that is, 
the principles these people reflectively endorse) govern. But why not, at any 
moment, let other people do the work or take a little extra for oneself? And 
if any one person should be susceptible to that temptation, why not every-
one? And so forth down the familiar path until we are all non-voters impris-
oned for medium-length terms amidst pastures exhausted by overgrazing. 
Sen does not fully develop an answer, but his response contains the cor-
nerstones of two lines of argument. One is that identification with a relevant 
group of others means accepting certain rules of conduct toward others and 
not engaging in relentless calculation toward self-interested maximiza-
tion.134 Self-interest bounded by such rules is, of course, entirely ordinary; 
but self-interested calculation that persistently disregards such rules in-
cludes a failure or refusal to identify with others.135 To say that rationality 
includes the substantive commitments generated by interpersonal and group 
identification, then, is to say that it includes a valuation of shared rules as 
things to be obeyed. 
A second line of argument is more thinly developed in Sen but provoca-
tive nonetheless. This has to do with the relationship between agency and 
identity. As Sen stresses, “‘We’ demand things; ‘our’ actions reflect ‘our’ 
concerns; ‘we’ protest at injustice done to ‘us.’”136 That is, in speech and 
writing people habitually ascribe agency to collectives with which they 
identify. Although that form of speech might be mere rhetorical license, it 
also might indicate something about the experience of agency. If I vote for 
the winning candidate in a presidential campaign in which I care strongly 
about the outcome, and the candidate wins by more than one vote, do I ex-
perience myself as having committed a superfluous act of no significance or 
as having a share in bringing about a victory? Introspection suggests that the 
answer is the latter and that having no such experience—feeling the act of 
voting was entirely inefficacious—would indicate that one had already dis-
identified from the partisan or civic identity that made sense of the act of 
voting. Moreover, reflection suggests that the experience of agency in such 
collective accomplishments is not the fraction of effort that one’s contribu-
tion made up, e.g., one forty-millionth part of a victory. Consider a winning 
baseball team. Although individual contributions are relatively easy to tally 
in that sport, a player whose contribution was “non-necessary” to the win—
  
 134. Id. at 216-17. 
 135. Sen’s formulation connects his thought with that of Alexis de Tocqueville, who regarded “self-
interest rightly understood” as the motivation that would check individualism and permit widespread 
social cooperation in the United States and, potentially, in democratic, individualistic societies generally. 
AMARTYA SEN, Rationality & Social Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 83, at 261, 285 
n.44 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 122 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 
1945) (1840). As Sen points out, he draws his emphasis on the importance of customary rules in part 
from Adam Smith, who stressed their “great use in correcting misrepresentations of self-love concerning 
what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation.” See SEN, supra note 116, at 217 (quoting 
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 160 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) 
(1790)). 
 136. Id. at 215. 
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in the sense that it did not provide the margin of victory—would be con-
fused, maybe even narcissistic, if he decided the win therefore had nothing 
to do with his participation. Moreover, each player’s experience of 
achievement would not be one-ninth of some sum of achievement, ascribed 
to a collective agent called “the team.” There is no such sum. The experi-
ence of agency occurs only in individuals, and each individual has the ex-
perience expressed in “we won,” an experience that is possible only because 
of each individual’s identification with the team. 
On this account, then, an act of voting would be an act of agency de-
pendent on identification with the party, movement, or principles of the 
candidate. A victory means that the voter’s experience is “we won,” an un-
divided experience of achievement that by its nature belongs to each voter 
who contributed. The intensity of the experience will vary with the magni-
tude of the achievement (whether the race was hard-fought, how deep and 
consequential the difference of principle was) and the level of the voter’s 
identification with the party, movement, or principle. It will not vary with 
whether the voter’s contribution provided the margin of victory, nor will it 
be divided by the number of contributing voters. Such restrictions are in the 
nature of purely self-regarding agency but not in the nature of agency prem-
ised on identification with a collective. 
4. The Question for Neuroeconomics 
This discussion leaves us with several alternative accounts of why neo-
classical models of rationality frequently fail to predict the outcomes of 
collective-action problems. One, Kahan’s, is based on the satisfaction peo-
ple take in viewing themselves and others as reciprocators and in activity 
that confirms that view. Another, the first of Sen’s alternatives, is that group 
identification produces loyalty to common rules of conduct and that loyalty 
to these is part of the nature of group membership. A third is that group 
identification changes the experience of agency, producing an experience of 
undivided achievement based in accomplishments conventionally ascribed 
to the group. 
Of course, these accounts need not be mutually exclusive. It is possible 
that one, two, all, or none of them is right and likely that they account for 
different degrees of motivation across persons, contexts, and time. Neuroi-
maging in prisoner’s dilemma-type games, as discussed above, hints that 
when the decision maker experiences reciprocity or non-reciprocity with 
another concrete person (not necessarily visible but believed to be the 
source of decisions), some kind of spontaneous experience of welfare fol-
lows. Ultimatum game results suggest a corresponding experience of bad 
feeling and impulse to resist or punish upon the experience of non-
reciprocal behavior linked to another concrete person. These data, however, 
do not take us very far, even if we accept that reciprocity with concrete oth-
ers is motivated in the manner just sketched. We would still know nothing 
about which account best explains voting: an experience of agency medi-
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ated through identification with a collective; an extension of the welfare-
enhancing experience of reciprocity to an impersonal scale based on the 
impression that others are also contributing (voting); or respect for settled 
rules of conduct that are implied by membership in a collective. Moreover, 
as the lure of voting clearly exercises different relative force on different 
people, there is no reason not to believe that each of these motives comes 
into play sometimes, in some contexts, in some persons. 
To the extent that some of these motives are the social-emotional ones 
whose neural correlates have been observed in reciprocity games, their 
presence in other contexts might be observable. To the extent that the suc-
cessful exercise of agency has neural correlates, the role of this experience 
in contributions to collective enterprises would also be open to investiga-
tion. As for rules of conduct implied by group identification, it would be 
possible to investigate whether these display the same correlates as utilitar-
ian principles, when unproblematic and when under pressure from emotion-
ally laden motives. If so, it might be possible to discern when such princi-
ples are in play in reasoning about collective action and how powerful they 
are. 
B. Commodification: Is There a There There? 
1. The Anti-commodification Case 
A persistent problem for legal theory is the claim that commodification 
drains experience of moral richness and complexity. Commodification refers 
to governing a resource under the principles of market property, that is, al-
lowing ownership of it with the incident of alienation, so that it becomes an 
object of market logic. Above all, as a market commodity, the resource is 
fungible with other commodities, meaning that at any time its owner can 
convert it to cash and consequently to its cash equivalent in a bundle of 
other goods. This metric of value is the main object of the anti-
commodification complaint. The charge goes that valuing something in 
terms of its cash equivalent is inconsistent with valuing it for other qualities, 
such as beauty, personal attachment, or association with spiritual or cultural 
traditions. Moreover, according to critics of commodification, market valua-
tion tends to overwhelm or crowd out other forms of valuation, so that once 
something is commodified, those who once valued it for more elusive quali-
ties will learn in time to value it for its cash equivalent. A fully commodi-
fied world, the argument implies, would be on all points subject to the cur-
mudgeon’s complaint about the cynic: that he knows the price of everything 
but the value of nothing. Critics have directed variants of the argument at 
the use of markets for environmental regulation, the sale of organs, and pro-
posals for markets in adopted children. Although there are still stylized de-
bates over commodification’s good or bad qualities in general, Margaret 
Jane Radin, who substantially introduced commodification concerns to the 
American legal academy, has developed a much more nuanced view, argu-
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ing that many domains are properly governed by market-style rights and 
regimes but that goods connected with important or subtle forms of qualita-
tive value, such as sexuality, should not be.137  
There is quite a straightforward response to the complaint against com-
modification: Not so! One can simply deny that there is any inconsistency 
between valuing things for their qualitative properties and putting a price on 
them. After all, does the price not reflect our qualitative appreciation of the 
thing? If parents paid a market rate to adopt a child, it would presumably be 
because they were moved by all the usual parental motivations. And doesn’t 
the price of beautiful homes or beautiful clothes reflect (in addition, per-
haps, to their status value) potential buyers’ appreciation of their beauty? 
Even if one accepted that the two metrics of value are in some meaning-
ful sense incompatible, rather than believe commodity value is derivative of 
qualitative value, that would not imply that commodity value ineluctably 
overwhelms more qualitative forms of value. It would still be perfectly pos-
sible in principle that the two could coexist. This is a weaker version of not 
so but nonetheless a variant of the same answer. 
There is also an affirmative response to the anti-commodification 
charge. On this account, commodifying things is not just neutral in its effect 
on their valuation; rather, it is a way of designating them as mattering and 
thus increasing or accentuating their “qualitative” value. This argument has 
two versions, varying usually with the resource at issue. For non-human 
resources—such as environmental goods—the suggestion is that whatever 
pious noises people may make, in practice when things have no price, we 
tend to treat them not as priceless but as worthless. To say that one must pay 
for emitting air pollution, therefore, does not imply that the atmosphere is a 
  
 137. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-15, 79-101 (1996) (laying out the 
argument that commodification can have bad consequences for moral, emotional, and social life); Jenni-
fer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the Commodification of the 
Self, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 151-52 (1998) (arguing that regarding the self as a bundle of alienable 
resources stunts the ability to discern nonecomonimc value in persons); David E. Jefferies, The Body as 
Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 655 
(1998) (considering the argument that a market in organs will reduce altruism); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Conceiving a Code for Creation: The Legal Debate Surrounding Human Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1123, 1126 (2000): 
We want the legal system to make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodificaiton of love, 
family, and other commitments close to ourselves. . . . Some people think that if we start talk-
ing about children as things we own, and about one as being fungible with the other, and ex-
pect them to maximize our pleasure in life, we might start actually trading them one day. 
Norman W. Spaulding, Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of 
Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 311-13 (1997) (considering the pscychological experi-
ences of “commodity fetishism” and “alienation” as consequences of commodification); Note, The Price 
of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 
(2003) (surveying, in particular, arguments concerned with the devaluation of commodified goods and 
relationships, and proposing that the devaluation arises less from the designation of the goods as com-
modities than from the character of the consequent transactions, in which the fungibility of values is 
assumed); see also Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1146-47 (2000) (arguing that the use of apologies as bargaining chips in settlement negotiations drains a 
“moral process” of meaning by making it a “market trade”). 
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“mere commodity”; rather, it carries the message that the atmosphere is 
worth something. 
The second version of the affirmative response concerns commodifica-
tion of aspects of human beings, particularly their time and labor power but 
also organs, reproductive capacity, sexuality, and any other quality that an-
other might seek to purchase or rent. The argument, which arose in the de-
bate over commodification of labor, is that by (1) enabling people to ex-
change for market value what they previously could not, commodification 
increases their options and thus their effective freedom, and (2) by creating 
a legally enforceable right to refuse to exchange these aspects of one’s self, 
commodification defines a boundary of legal identity that reinforces auton-
omy and dignity.138 
2. The Failure of Inquiry and The Question for Neuroeconomics 
Serious inquiry into the issue of commodification has all but ended. A 
good part of the reason, I suggest, is that commodification presents a classic 
other minds problem. Take it as true that Margaret Radin experiences com-
modification as draining its objects of their other dimensions of value. That 
tells us nothing about how Richard Posner, or anybody else, would respond 
to the same act of commodification. To make the point more abstractly and 
precisely: the prediction of the anti-commodification position is observa-
tionally indistinguishable from its contrary, so positive inquiry can tell us 
nothing. Describe a labor market; at the end of the description, you will 
have added nothing to our knowledge of whether participation in such a 
market degrades, ennobles, or merely allocates efficiently the act of labor. 
Describe a market in environmental pollution credits; the same discouraging 
proviso applies. Positive inquiry is in this respect restricted to regarding 
people as black boxes. When the question concerns the experience of 
value—not the choice that follows but the qualities at play in the judgment 
that generates the choice—epistemic chastity toward other minds turns out 
to be a chastity belt. 
Here, neuroimaging has some promise of suggesting certain initial cuts, 
in a phrase, whether there is a there in commodification theory. The image 
of reasoning suggested by commodification theorists is very much like that 
evoked by neuroimaging results in the ultimatum game and moral reasoning 
exercises: a struggle between a cognitively operational principle—here, 
maximizing commodity value—and a less cognitive response such as aes-
thetic appreciation, reverence, or love, which arrives in consciousness as a 
direct perception, rather than being mediated by conscious application of a 
principle. It is possible, of course, that this description misapprehends the 
  
 138. I have discussed this argument in more detail. See Purdy, supra note 52, at 125-58 (discussing 
the arguments of Adam Smith and other early-modern market advocates that commodification of labor 
produced increasingly reciprocal relationships and reduced the indignity and degradation of status-based 
labor obligations). 
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anti-commodification charge and that the claim is instead that viewing 
things in terms of their maximum commodity value becomes as “pre-
cognitive” as beauty or pain, but suppose otherwise for the moment. If there 
is anything to this, then we might hypothesize that judgments involving 
trading off, say, money against beautiful landscapes or time with intimates 
would correlate with a pattern of brain activity like those of the ultimatum 
game and moral-reasoning dilemmas. Such a finding would lend credence 
to the idea that these tradeoffs involve essentially different kinds of valua-
tion. Tracking parallel tradeoffs in ways designed to capture degrees of 
commodification would then suggest something about the substance—or the 
emptiness—of commodification theory. 
C. Authoritarianism: The Highest Stakes and The Otherest Minds 
1. The Positivist Problem 
Among the most consequential questions one might want social inquiry 
to address is why authoritarian politics succeeds or fails. 139 Authoritarian 
movements and governments have been the bane of democracies throughout 
the twentieth century, from Nazism to today’s radical Hindu and Islamist 
politics: wherever they come to power through elections or attract popular 
support, they suggest that democracy may be self-immolating, at least under 
certain circumstances. Since Theodor Adorno and his collaborators began 
trying to understand varying individual attraction to fascism in Nazi Ger-
many, students of authoritarian disposition have broadly agreed on the po-
litical attitudes whose origins they seek to understand: “suppression of 
[moral, cultural, and/or racial] difference and achievement of uniformity,” 
expressed in politics through “autocratic social arrangements in which indi-
vidual autonomy yields to group authority.”140 These attitudes characterized 
  
 139. In the formal social-science literature, this question got seriously underway with the publication 
of The Authoritarian Personality in 1950. See T. W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN 
PERSONALITY (1950). Sponsored and copyrighted by the American Jewish Committee, this massive 
study was a direct response to the arresting fact that Nazism had come to power in an educated, democ-
ratic, and, it would have seemed, relatively liberal society. Id. at ii-v. The motive to make sense of the 
fascist appeal through social psychology, however, went back at least to Erich Fromm’s Escape from 
Freedom, published early in the Second World War. See ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 
(1941). Subsequently, Robert Jay Lifton pursued Fromm’s and Adorno’s psychoanalytic approach to the 
problem, asking how the apocalyptic political impulse arises, persuading adherents that a climactic act of 
violence can make the world whole and pure. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, DESTROYING THE WORLD TO 
SAVE IT: AUM SHINRIKYŌ, APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE, AND THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM (1999). De-
parting sharply from the psychodynamic approach, Canadian political psychologist Bob Altemeyer has 
described authoritarian attitudes as a product of “social learning,” a package of attitudes acquired and 
reinforced in one’s social setting rather than related to any predisposition firmly established in early life. 
See BOB ALTEMEYER, ENEMIES OF FREEDOM: UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM 51-
99 (1988). Others have stayed with the idea of strong predispositions, but looked to biological rather 
than social bases for these. See C.S. Bergeman et al., Genetic and Environmental Effects on Openness to 
Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness: An Adoption/Twin Study, 61 J. OF PERSONALITY 159 
(1993).  
 140. KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC 15 (2005). Stenner elsewhere elaborates on 
her findings in connection with this model:  
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fascist and nationalist movements in the early and middle decades of the 
twentieth century, and they characterize today’s forms of extremism as well. 
Understanding why such politics appeals to some and repels others would 
be a momentous achievement. 
Yet the problem has not inspired methodological lucidity. Instead, sev-
eral persistent difficulties led to the eclipse of the study of authoritarian 
disposition. First was a confusion of independent and dependent variables. 
Researchers confounded the hypothetical object of the study—a disposition 
to authoritarian appeals—with its expression, adherence to authoritarian 
political beliefs.141 Identifying bearers of authoritarian disposition by their 
expression of authoritarian beliefs collapsed the distinction and left a circu-
lar definition of the authoritarian disposition: that disposition evidenced by 
expression of the same authoritarian beliefs the disposition was meant to 
explain.142 Second was a related conceptual failure: the conflation of “au-
thoritarian” attitudes with the political program of “right-wing” parties in 
the home countries of the investigators, so that “authoritarianism” was run 
together with other, local elements of right-wing politics, such as the con-
servative distaste for change in general and the libertarian preference for 
free markets over redistribution and economic regulation.143 Third, theorists 
have mostly lacked any account of when the hypothetical disposition pro-
duces actual adherence to authoritarian politics and when it lies dormant.144 
Stenner’s response is to isolate a definition of “authoritarian” disposi-
tion that is distinct from conservative and libertarian outlooks and does not 
depend on the same political attitudes that it is supposed to predict. More-
over, she offers a testable theory of why the authoritarian disposition some-
times finds expression in intolerant political attitudes and sometimes lies 
dormant. Stenner defines the authoritarian disposition as “some general 
desire . . . to transfer sovereignty to, and commit self and others to confor-
mity with some collective order,” connected to a deep-set belief that the 
security and trustworthiness of the social world depend on “collective au-
  
[A]uthoritarians proved to be greatly alarmed by departures from moral and cultural absolut-
ism, by any deviation from unquestioning conformity to external authority. And most charac-
teristic of all, they invariably looked first to leaders and institutions to reinstate and reinforce 
the normative order, seeking to marshal the authority of the state to “institute” the mainte-
nance of “civility” and “hold up our moral values . . . .”  
Id. at 267.  
 141. See id. at 20-23 (outlining this problem). 
 142. See R. Nevitt Sanford et al., The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends, in THE 
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY, supra note 139, at 222, 222-79 (explaining the method of measuring the 
authoritarian personality, the now-notorious “F Scale”). Altemeyer’s “Right-Wing Authoritarianism” 
suffers from the same difficulty. See ALTEMEYER, supra note 139. 
 143. See STENNER, supra note 140, at 138-98 (comparing authoritarian with conservative disposi-
tions); id. at 236-68 (comparing authoritarian with libertarian dispositions). This confusion has the 
methodologically unsettling consequence that, for instance, Russian communists who abhor the chaos of 
quasi-democratic capitalism score high on a “right-wing authoritarianism” measure that includes a pref-
erence for libertarian economic policies as part of its definition of authoritarianism. Id. at 149-50 (report-
ing and commenting on this “finding” by Altemeyer). 
 144. Id. at 17-20 (outlining this difficulty and a response). 
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thority and conformity, of oneness and sameness.”145 She hypothesizes that 
this disposition finds expression under circumstances of “normative threat,” 
when the “collective order” is threatened by conflicting values, “moral de-
cay,” or evidence that political leaders are unreliable.146 Thus, under condi-
tions of apparent stability and moral consensus, authoritarians’ views may 
not differ much from those of others. When events present “normative 
threat,” however, authoritarians will respond with more conformist and pu-
nitive positions than non-authoritarians and will make it a high political 
priority to rebuild stable and trustworthy authority.147 By contrast, libertari-
ans are much less likely to express increasingly authoritarian views even 
under conditions of normative threat.148 Conservatives, while resistant to 
change and often hostile to dissensus, tend to mistrust the programs that 
distinguish authoritarian politics: efforts to reconstitute authority in the face 
of perceived breakdown, a strategy which many forms of nationalism and 
fascism exemplify.149 
Methodologically, Stenner measures authoritarian disposition through 
questions designed to probe child-rearing values.150 She asks respondents to 
rank as more important one of a pair of qualities that parents might want to 
inculcate in their children.151 The pairings present alternatives such as “[the 
child] follows the rules” or “he follows his own conscience,” and “he has 
respect for his elders” or “he thinks for himself.”152 Stenner proposes that 
these questions elicit basic orientations toward the relative value and impor-
tance of authority and uniformity versus autonomy and diversity.153 Because 
child-rearing is a personal and high-stakes activity, she believes the answers 
should capture genuine, deep-set attitudes.154 Stenner has found that high 
scores on her child-rearing-based authoritarianism index correspond to 
heightened levels of authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative 
threat, suggesting that the index captures the disposition she hypothe-
sizes.155 
  
 145. Id. at 141. 
 146. Id. at 11-12, 26-29 (describing features of her theory of normative threat). 
 147. Id. at 26-29, 85-98 (outlining authoritarian responses to normative threat and contrasting these 
with conservative responses). 
 148. Id. at 261-68 (describing libertarian subjects as resistant to the idea that social phenomena that 
constitute normative threat for authoritarians are in fact evidence of “moral decay”). 
 149. Id. at 85-98. Stenner gives the telling example of Britain, where intolerance gets much support 
from authoritarianism, but little from conservatism, because the country’s tolerant traditions make dispo-
sitional conservatism an ally of toleration. Id. at 95-98. 
 150. Id. at 23. 
 151. Id. at 23-25. 
 152. Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. Id. at 24-25. 
 154. Id.. It strikes me as a fair concern that there is indeed a politics of parenting, and people’s ideo-
logical and partisan affiliations may well influence their announced priorities in raising children. A 
glance at the cultural politics of the Christian Right in the United States will confirm this point. That 
said, however, precisely because child-rearing is intimate and has substantial and immediate conse-
quences, Stenner’s judgment that it provides a relatively independent clue to basic orientations is plausi-
ble. Moreover, her findings upon testing the theory are impressive. 
 155. Id. at 199-268 (detailing findings of Stenner’s research). 
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2. The Persistence of Interpretation 
It is critical to Stenner’s methodological contribution that she treats her 
index of child-rearing values as an independent variable. Although this is a 
promising move as a matter of social-science methodology, it does not dis-
pel the problems that dog authoritarian studies. The aim in specifying the 
independent variable is to pick out some feature of personality that precedes 
politics and thus can explain why people with that personality adopt one 
political attitude rather than another. The difficulty is that, as the interpretiv-
ist position proposes, expressions of personality are always inflected 
through culturally specific worldviews. Thus, normative conceptions of the 
family and the adult personality that child-rearing should produce are hardly 
more fixed or pre-political than more traditionally political attitudes. Rather, 
they are the products of constant interaction between ideological and mate-
rial contests: on the one hand, ideas about the good or just family and the 
good or dignified person;156 on the other hand, the control of resources that 
structures the “cooperative competition” within families and thus contrib-
utes to each succeeding generation’s idea of what families actually are and 
normatively should be.157 Moreover, ideas of the family are frequently part 
of explicitly political disputes and the partisan identity of citizens. One need 
reach no further for evidence than the choice of “family values” as a rally-
ing point for cultural conservatives in the United States; the response that 
“hate is not a family value”; and the political charge of disputes over same-
sex marriage.  
Moreover, family structure seems to work in a dynamic relationship 
with other values. For instance, research in India has found that the survival 
rates of female children go up considerably relative to male children when 
mothers become literate and enter the workforce.158 Amartya Sen has ar-
gued that families become more gender-egalitarian as women increase both 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands and their ideas of what the 
world might hold for them.159 Such changes have at least three, interde-
pendent elements: (1) political decisions to encourage women’s education 
and access to labor markets; (2) women’s assertion of enhanced agency in 
the family after taking advantage of these changes; and (3) changing norma-
tive ideas of the family, specifically an increasingly egalitarian view of sons 
and daughters. Intuitively, these changes should be mutually reinforcing, as 
each would tend to support the others. While this example does not speak to 
  
 156. See TAYLOR, supra note 104, at 211-33 (describing rise of “the affirmation of ordinary life” of 
production, reproduction, and emotional attachment as a critical episode in the development of contem-
porary self-understanding). 
 157. For a discussion of the idea, see SEN, supra note 86, at 196-203. The concept of cooperative 
competition proposes that, while families act as a unit vis-à-vis the outside world (at least in many 
cases), within each family a set of priorities and decision procedures emerges from internal contests, 
which partly reflect each member’s control over resources and choice of alternatives to going along with 
the family’s present form and commitments. See id. 
 158. Id. at 195-98. 
 159. Id. at 198-203. 
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authoritarianism as such, it does instance the interaction of political and 
child-rearing attitudes beyond cases, such as “family values,” in which fam-
ily structure is explicitly politicized. 
None of this is to deny that Stenner proposes an enriched set of correla-
tions among attitudes that may reveal much about the interaction of ideas 
about authority, order, and the threat of disorder at different levels of social 
structure, politics, and the family. Moreover, homologies between attitudes 
toward family and toward politics add credence to the belief in some invari-
ant need for order and authority and mistrust of plurality and uncertainty, 
which might indeed be called a “personality.” Nonetheless, the concept of 
personality or disposition is no more than a metaphor for a constellation of 
attitudes that all occur on the same level of expression: participation in an 
already interpreted world of cultural and political values. Moreover, on this 
evidence it may or may not be a misleading metaphor, suggesting an essen-
tial core of social-psychological potential that moves with a person 
throughout her life, exhibiting itself subtly in child-rearing attitudes and 
now and again erupting into politics when “normative threat” awakes it. 
3. The Question for Neuroeconomics 
What would be genuinely new in this area would be to generate neuro-
imaging correlates for the key experiences in Stenner’s model: encountering 
unwelcome evidence of cultural and ideological diversity, such as gay or 
interracial couples; facing instances of individuality-oriented child-rearing; 
perceiving political leaders and other emblems of authority besmirched or 
shamed, as during Richard Nixon’s last years in office or Bill Clinton’s pe-
riod of sexual scandal. Stenner hypothesizes that these experiences trigger 
the same, or a closely related, sense of threat.160 We know a little about the 
neurological correlates of threat, particularly the primitive sense of threat 
presented by a confusing and alarming problem that defies our mastery—
such as uncertainty about the odds of a gamble, to take a particularly blood-
less example. Neuroimagining could falsify or let stand the hypothesis that a 
common experience of threat unites these events. 
Moreover, neuroimaging might reveal something about the character of 
susceptibility to authoritarian political appeals. If the hypothesis of a com-
mon threat structure found some support in imaging, the next step would be 
to explore the correlates of responsiveness to, let us say, videos of speeches 
by authoritarian leaders. (Although there will inevitably be partisan carping, 
I would nominate Patrick J. Buchanan’s 1992 address to the Republican 
National Convention for American subjects.) What are the neural correlates 
of response to such political appeals? Are they more intense in those whose 
sense of threat has recently been engaged? And with what other attitudes 
and responses are they correlated? Is the responsive brain region associated 
  
 160. See STENNER, supra note 140, at 335. 
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with relief, aggression, higher reasoning? Do the correlates suggest a con-
test among regions of the brain, as with difficult ethical problems, or an 
unchecked emotional reaction? How do they differ from the correlates of, 
for instance, a participant in a structured exercise in reasoned political de-
liberation? 
Hypotheses about authoritarian personality or disposition rely, like 
Stenner’s, on claims that a set of observable attitudes and responses ex-
presses some underlying orientation to the world, which might be identified 
independently of at least some of its expressions. Neuroimaging has the 
potential (1) to test the hypothesis that the pattern reflects a unified underly-
ing response and (2) to characterize the other emotions and cognitive func-
tions associated with that response and to contrast it with other kinds of 
political judgment. 
As I stressed in discussing the interdependence of family and political 
attitudes, one must put aside any idea that brain activity is somehow the 
foundation and one-way cause of emotions and judgments, so that identify-
ing the true underlying facts would enable us to make confident generaliza-
tions and predictions about the epiphenomena of mind, culture, and politics. 
Neural correlates are just that, correlates, and the mental experiences to 
which they correspond are the activity of self-interpreting human beings. 
Nonetheless, patterns of correlation are facts that bridge some of the dis-
tance between observer and observed, diminishing the importance of the 
problem of other minds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
How do people overcome collective-action problems? What do we 
value, and does our valuation change along with legal and social institu-
tions? Why do some democratic citizens adopt authoritarian political atti-
tudes while others resist them? It would be hard to identify a more basic set 
of questions for social inquiry. The first concerns the origins and persistence 
of social, political, and legal order. The second delves into the basic pur-
poses and principles that guide that order. The third addresses the most ele-
mental intrinsic threat to our liberal version of such order. 
Each of these questions is at something of an impasse—particularly the 
second two, which are foundering on the suspicion that no there is there. 
The impasse has its origins in the limitations of the main methodological 
alternatives in social inquiry. Positivism takes seriously the inaccessibility 
of other minds and thus stops chastely short of essential questions about the 
motivations of social phenomena. Interpretivism takes seriously the impor-
tance of other minds but produces non-falsifiable fabrics of interpretation 
that depend, in the end, on the axioms one has selected to describe the inner 
lives of human beings. 
The tantalizing promise of neuroeconomics is to bridge the gap between 
the two methods by rendering literally visible the activity of other minds. It 
will let us see reason, fear, and principle at work, let us watch utility accu-
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mulate or dissipate. The promise is not a mirage but neither is it the whole 
world. Reflecting on the three problems where I have suggested neu-
roeconomics can help overcome methodological limitations reveals a point 
too basic to overcome. Sometimes interpretation is an imperfect substitute 
for positive knowledge: when neuroimaging reveals the place of primitive 
fear in aversion to uncertainty, we have learned something and can set aside 
certain interpretive alternatives. Sometimes, however, interpretation is in-
dispensable because the facts of human activity are constituted by interpre-
tation: individual and shared self-understandings, concerning both the na-
ture of the world we confront and the nature of the value it contains, that 
vary across persons and across cultures. Knowledge of neural correlates can 
help to distinguish interpretations of interpretations, ideas about what, ex-
actly, is going on “in there,” but it cannot get interpretation out of the story 
by replacing it with a series of observable facts. Too often, those facts com-
prise and are the correlates of shifting and contested interpretation. 
All of this strikes me as hopeful, even wonderful. Human experience is 
open-ended, in individual lives and in history, because we change as our 
self-understandings change. Because we are self-aware and self-interpreting 
creatures, no objective knowledge of our nature could ever reduce us to 
functions of neural events; those events are reciprocally born of our cultural 
and mental lives. The new knowledge of neuroeconomics does, however, 
promise to help us set aside some interpretive mistakes, choose among in-
terpretive alternatives, and add to our stock of positive facts. It may make us 
less obscure to ourselves and to one another.  
 
